Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
LLM Theses

Theses and Dissertations

10-10-2014

Labour Law and Triangular Employment Growth
Timothy John Bartkiw

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/llm
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bartkiw, Timothy John, "Labour Law and Triangular Employment Growth" (2014). LLM Theses. 8.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/llm/8

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in LLM Theses by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Labour Law and Triangular Employment Growth

Timothy J. Bartkiw

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAW
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN LAW,
YORK UNIVERSITY
TORONTO, ONTARIO

October, 2014

© Timothy J. Bartkiw, 2014

ii

Abstract

This thesis is concerned with understanding the relationship between labour law and triangular
employment growth, and particularly in "staffing services" contexts. A review of alternative
explanations for growth in triangular employment within three theoretical paradigm (neoclassical,
institutionalist, and critical) illustrates the theoretical space for conceiving of a relationship between the
particularities of labour law and triangular employment growth. To this end, the thesis develops the
concept of a regulatory differential, or ways in which a legal regime may produce differential regulatory
effects as between direct and triangular forms of employment. A typology of regulatory differentials is
outlined. Further, a discussion of the relationship between these differentials and employer‐status rules
is provided, and it is suggested that the logic of the framework may helpfully inform analysis of
triangular employment growth within a given jurisdiction, as well as comparative analysis of this
phenomenon. The theoretical framework is then applied towards examining diverging growth rates in
triangular employment as between Canada and the U.S. Legal analysis examining two key sub‐fields of
labour suggests that the presence (and expansion) of key regulatory differentials in the U.S., absent in
Canada, may help explain the observed patterns of triangular employment growth in these countries.
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Introduction and Overview of Portfolio Thesis:
In addition to the brief introductory and concluding thoughts in this linking document, this portfolio
thesis is essentially comprised of two separate manuscripts submitted to two academic peer‐reviewed
journals in the field of labour law. The first manuscript has been accepted for publication by the
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations and is currently “in press”.
The second manuscript has been accepted for publication with the Employee Rights and Employment
Policy Journal. The most current versions of the manuscripts are included herein, with citations.
This thesis is concerned with understanding the phenomenon of triangular employment and its growth
in recent decades. Growth in forms of triangular employment has contributed to increased precarity in
the labour market, a well‐documented trend in the modern economy.1 More specifically, this thesis
examines growth in triangular employment in the context of certain types of “staffing services” provided
by an increasingly large and global staffing industry, to “user” firms. Triangular employment is
understood here as the state in which either the service “provider” or “user” firm purports not to be the
(or a) de jure “employer” of the worker, but the facts raise objective question or concern as to the
allocation of de jure employer status.
The content, structure, and objectives of the two manuscripts are deeply intertwined, and constitute a
coherent joint project that can be summarized as follows. The first manuscript examines the
phenomenon of triangular employment growth largely in theoretical terms. It engages with alternative
explanations for triangular employment growth that emerge from three different theoretical
perspectives (neoclassical, institutionalist, and critical/Marxist). The first manuscript also puts forth
certain challenges or caveats to some prevailing explanations for triangular employment growth based
on claims about legitimate “efficiencies” being produced. Overall, the review of alternative theoretical
explanations suggests significant space for understanding triangular employment growth as being
normatively problematic. The theoretical analysis also supports the view that various characteristics of
a given labour law regime are potentially important factors affecting triangular employment growth
within a jurisdiction. The manuscript then provides a conceptual framework for considering this
relationship based on the concept of a regulatory differential, or ways in which a legal regime produces
different regulatory effects as between direct and triangular employment forms. A typology of various
1

A. Bernhardt et al., (eds), The Gloves Off Economy: Workplace Standards at the Bottom of the American Economy
(Champaign, IL: Labour and Employment Relations Association, 2008); Leah F. Vosko, ed., Precarious Employment:
Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada, (Kingston: Mc‐Gill Queens University Press, 2005).
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forms of regulatory differentials is developed, and the difference between formal, contingent, and
informal regulatory differentials is discussed. Domestic employer status rules, and their role as
additional, independent factors mediating the effects of underlying regulatory differentials upon
triangular employment growth, are also discussed. It is suggested that this framework may helpfully
inform analysis of domestic sources of triangular employment growth and/or serve as an improved lens
for comparative analysis relating to triangular employment growth and/or its regulation.
The second manuscript applies the analytical framework developed in the first, towards understanding
triangular employment growth in Canada and the U.S.. Data on growth rates in two key forms of
staffing services embodying triangular employment – “temporary help” and “professional employer”2 –
services are reviewed. Using measures of the aggregate volume of these two services as an indicator of
the volume of triangular employment, the data reveals that over the past few decades there has been
significant growth in triangular employment in both countries, but much greater growth in the U.S..
Applying the analytical framework from the first manuscript, legal analysis is provided examining trends
in relevant employer status rules and in underlying regulatory differentials, in both countries. Due to
various constraints, analysis of regulatory differentials is limited to two key labour law sub‐fields
containing starkly different patterns of regulatory differentials in the two countries: the regulation of
retirement plans and the regulation of employer‐sponsored healthcare benefits. This legal analysis
reveals the existence of significant formal and contingent regulatory differentials3 in each of these sub‐
fields in the U.S. that are lacking comparators in Canada, and that in each case, the timing of the
emergence of regulatory differentials and/or their exacerbation by subsequent legal developments, was
fairly consistent with historical patterns of aggregate triangular employment growth. Similarly,
diverging developments in employer status rules in Canada and the U.S. are also consistent with these
outcomes. Overall, the general consistency between the history of legal developments and patterns of
triangular employment growth supports the relevance of the theoretical framework in understanding
triangular employment growth in Canada and the U.S..
It is hoped that the theoretical framework developed herein, articulated in the first manuscript and
applied in the second, helps further our understanding of triangular employment growth and provides a
helpful frame for comparative analysis in this area. Triangular employment growth continues to
2

As discussed in this paper, variants of these services were historically sometimes referred to as “employee
leasing” services.
3
As argued in the paper, in the case of these two sub‐fields, the particular regulatory differentials here seem
capable of generating gains from triangular employment that are concrete, measurable, and monetary.

3
undermine the efficacy of labour law, so understanding the relationship between it and the
particularities of labour law remains an important project. As discussed in the concluding section of the
second manuscript, in the broader U.S. institutional context, triangular employment may have also
served an additional role of assisting policy makers in preserving regressive policy outcomes in the
pension and healthcare sub‐fields. Future studies may similarly seek to probe the relations between
triangular employment growth, labour law, and other aspects of social welfare.
Finally, it should be noted that the Canada‐U.S. comparative analysis here was limited to two key sub‐
fields of law, and analysis could be extended to additional sub‐fields. Future research may carry this
forward, for additional insight. Finally, it is also suggested that future research probing the nature and
consequences of triangular employment generated particularly by professional employer services is
important, given the tremendous growth in these arrangements and the lack of research examining this
phenomenon to date.

4

Paper # 1: Timothy J. Bartkiw, “Labour Law and Triangular Employment
Growth: A Theory of Regulatory Differentials”, International Journal of
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Vol. 30, Issue 4 (In Press).

I.

Introduction

Triangular employment arrangements have become increasingly prevalent in many countries in
recent decades.1 Various models of triangular employment exist in practice, under numerous
labels, partly as a result of a proliferation in the range of “services” provided by an increasingly
globalized “staffing” industry. Triangular employment growth has been widespread, yet also
quite uneven, across numerous jurisdictions.2
This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the roots of triangular employment, and
its comparatively uneven expansion, in the following ways. Part II of the paper probes the
concept of triangular employment, towards clarifying its meaning and recognition, particularly
in staffing service contexts. Part III provides a review of how three alternative theoretical
perspectives (Neoclassical, Institutionalist, and Critical) provide competing understandings of
triangular employment and explanations for its growth. Building on these insights, Part IV of

1

Donald Storrie, Temporary Agency Work in the European Union (European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions, Luxembourg: Office for the Publications of the European Communities, 2002);
Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, “Flexible Recession: The Temporary Staffing Industry and Mediated Work in the
United States”, 31(2) Cambridge Journal of Economics 171. (2007); Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, Temped Out?
“Industry Rhetoric, Labour Regulation, and Economic Restructuring in the Temporary Staffing Business”, 23(2)
Economic and Industrial Democracy 143 (May 2002); Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore and Kevin Ward, “Constructing
Markets for Temporary Labour: Employment Liberalization and the Internationalization of the Staffing Industry”,
Global Networks 5, 1 (2005), 3‐26. Leah Vosko, Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a precarious Employment
Relationship (Toronto: U of T Press, 2000); Timothy J. Bartkiw, “Baby Steps? Towards the Regulation of Temporary
Help Agency Employment in Canada”, 31(1) Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 163 (Fall 2009); and Britton
Lombardi and Yukako Ono, “Professional Employer Organizations: What are they, who uses them, and why should
we care?”, Economic Perspectives (4th quarter, 2008); Shelley Wallach, “Temporary? Agency Workers in Israel”,
The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, vol. 24/3, 423‐44); Stefan van Eck,
“Employment Agencies: International Norms and Developments in South Africa”, The International Journal of
Comparative Labour law and Industrial Relations 28, no. 1 (2012): 29‐44; ); L. Mitlacher , “The Role of Temporary
Agency Work in Different Industrial Relations Systems — a Comparison between Germany and the USA,” 45 British
Journal of Industrial Relations, 581 (2007).
2
Peck, Theodore, and Ward, supra note 1; Storrie, supra, note 1.
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the paper then addresses the question of the potential relationship between the particularities
of labour law and triangular employment growth. The paper provides a conceptual framework
for considering this question, based on the concept of “regulatory differentials”, or ways in
which a legal regime produces different regulatory effects across direct and triangular forms of
employment. A typology of various forms of regulatory differentials is also provided. Part V of
the paper provides some concluding thoughts, suggesting that the framework developed may
helpfully inform analysis of domestic sources of triangular employment growth, and may be an
improved lens for comparative analysis of this sort.
II.

What is Triangular Employment?

In a 2006 ILO report, triangular employment arrangements are summarized as comprising two
possible sets of contractual relationships: 1) contracts for the performance of work and
services, and 2) contracts for the supply of labour services.3 In scenario 1, a so‐called
“provider” organization contracts with a “third party” organization, referred to as the “user”, to
produce and supply some form of work or service. The provider then uses its own equipment
and/or personnel to supply this work or service to the user, for use within the user’s production
process. In scenario 2, the “supply of labour services” scenario, the commodity supplied under
contract by the “provider” is ostensibly “labour” itself, or in other words, work performed by
personnel ostensibly “employed” by the provider. In distinguishing the two forms, the classical
distinction between “labour” and “labour power” is informative. In this view, organizations
actually purchase labour power, which must then be managed within a labour process, towards
the production of some commodity. Thus, in scenario 1, the provider firm manages the worker
within its own labour process, and subsequently sells a commodity to the user firm. In scenario
2, the ultimate utilization of the underlying labour power occurs only within the user firm’s
labour process.
Despite the importance of historical trends in “subcontracting” arrangements, this paper
focuses on triangular relations found in scenario 2. Here, the user is a party to a commercial
contract with the provider, and the user lacks any ostensible/formal employment relationship
3

Report V(1) of the 95th Session of the international Labour Conference, p. 42.
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with the worker. For the user, this arrangement serves as a substitute for directly “employing”
workers. Given forms of triangularity in practice, the term “labour supply” may imply an
unnecessary constraint to the definition, since certain otherwise “triangular” relations, for our
purposes, may not include any concrete “dispatch” of workers but involve a range of other
services.4
According to the ILO, triangular employment relationships raise policy concern insofar as they
represent either “disguised employment” or “objectively ambiguous employment.”5 In the
latter case, there may actually be no intention to alter the appearance of the underlying
relationship, but the facts of the relationship raise serious questions about the proper
allocation of de jure employer status and ensuing rights and responsibilities.
The determination and allocation of de jure employer status is a function reserved to relevant
local authorities of various sorts, empowered to determine the existence of employment
relationships as a part of the regulatory function they perform. Local “employer‐status rules” in
statute, caselaw, and/or practices, institutionalize the concept of “employer” (and/or
“employee”, “employment” etc.), and vary across jurisdictions. Most jurisdictions adhere to
the “primacy of fact”, meaning that the facts of the relationship, not the label assigned by the
parties, is determinative. Overall then, in triangular employment, either the provider or user
purports not to be the (or a)6 de jure employer of the worker, but the facts raise some objective
question as to the allocation of de jure employer status.7
The various staffing industry services, or service “bundles”, may be differentiated in terms of
both a qualitative and temporal dimension. In terms of the former, there are different
4

The staffing industry provides a diverse bundle of services referred to alternatively as “staffing”, “personnel”,
“employment”, “human resources”, or “human capital” services. The American Staffing Association website
outlines following service categories: direct placement services; human resources consulting; long term and
contract help; managed service provider; managed services; outplacement; payrolling; professional employer
organization or employee leasing; recruitment process outsourcing; retained search services; temporary help;
temporary to hire; vendor management systems. See https://americanstaffing.net/commerce/memberJoin.cfm.
5
International Labour Conference, 91st Session, Report V: The Scope of the Employment Relationship, 2003, pp.
24‐25.
6
In other words, under triangular employment, one party may purport not to be the sole employer, nor one of the
multiple employers of the worker.
7
Importantly, in triangular employment all the parties typically acknowledge that there is a de jure “employment”
relationship in place.
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functions provided under different service bundles. For example, in North America, while
employee “screening” and “recruitment” functions are generally included in the “temporary
help” service bundle, these functions are less likely included in so‐called “employee leasing” or
“professional employer” service bundles. Specific services may either supplement or displace
functions performed by the user. Service bundles vary in the intensity of this substitution.
Certainly, not all staffing services should be understood as generating triangular employment,
as many such services would have little impact on the logic of de jure employer status.
Typically, in order to raise uncertainty about de jure employer status, a non‐negligible
substitution towards staffing services would be required. Secondly, there are important
temporal distinctions between different staffing service bundles. Although terminology varies,
examples of staffing services embodying an important short term temporal component include:
“day labour” (very short term), “temporary help” (short to medium term), and “temp to perm”
(short to medium term). Other services such as “employee leasing”, or “professional employer
services” are generally conceived as being non‐temporary, or for an indeterminate time
period.8 In the U.S., there has recently been a tremendous expansion in the use of these
explicitly non‐temporary triangular relations, particularly involving organizations self‐identified
as “Professional Employer Organizations” (“PEOs”).9 Indeed, the National Association of
Professional Employer Organizations (“NAPEO”), openly embraces triangular employment,
publicly claiming the ambiguous concept of “co‐employment” lies at the heart of its members’
services.10 Analytical focus emphasizing the qualitatively triangular nature of staffing

8

See the discussion in Edward A. Lenz, Co‐Employment: Employer Liability Issues In Third‐Party Staffing
Arrangements, 7TH ED. (Alexandria, VA: American Staffing Association, 2011). As Lenz points out, the term
“employee leasing” is sometimes used as a generic term to refer to all forms of staffing services. However, it is
more often (and here) understood as an intricate human resource outsourcing arrangement that purports to
transfer employer status to the employee leasing firm, increasingly referred to as “professional employer
organizations”.
9
Lombardi and Ono, supra, note 1.
10
“Co‐employment” is a term created by the PEO industry in the U.S., it is not an independent juridical category,
and thus not the same in the U.S. as the concepts of “joint employer” or “single employer” under common law. De
jure employer status of firms providing PEO services would still generally be determined by application of common
law employer status tests and the primacy of fact. As well, the industry itself does not seemingly define “co‐
employment” as being based on a single precise arrangement.. Rather, co‐employment is established by contract
between a PEO and a client, and the contract purports to allocate various human resources related functions and
responsibilities across the parties. See NAPEO website description of co‐employment at
http://www.napeo.org/peoindustry/coemployers.cfm. Although the use of professional employer service
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arrangements, abstracting away from temporal differences, is necessary and feasible. A key
question is what causes/consequences underlay growth in those qualitative types of services
generating triangular employment, regardless of temporality. In this vein, some academic
analysis argues that insufficient attention has been paid to the problematic of the triangular
dimension of temporary help services.11 Abstraction of this sort, emphasizing triangularity per
se, underpins the analysis in this paper, as we turn to examine competing theoretical
conceptualizations of the underlying roots of triangular employment growth.
III.

Triangular Employment Growth: Alternative Theoretical Explanations

Academic literature has provided a range of explanations for growth in triangular employment,
in its particular forms. While some suggest a desire on the part of employers to “avoid” the
effects of labour law/policy, others emphasize “legitimate” purposes. This paper adopts the
simple normative assumption that where status quo labour policy or the degree of social
protection is undermined by triangular employment, this is a prima facie problem.
Explanations of triangular employment growth based on the pursuit of “legitimate” purposes
emerge from explanations for growth in related staffing services themselves. These
explanations are rooted in neoclassical economic analysis, particularly the “theory of the
firm.”12 Storrie provides a helpful summary of such benefits potentially generated by
temporary help services:13
a) Economies of scale and an improved “division of labour” in the provision of certain
functions may be captured, where a staffing firm carries out functions across multiple
arrangements would not necessarily alter de jure employer status in every circumstance, arguably a significant
proportion of PEO arrangements would raise a serious question as to de jure employer status. This is heightened
by the fact that there is somewhat of an unclear definition of the PEO service bundle in the market, with some
firms offering “co‐employment” services as part of a continuum of related employment services. See for example
the list of employment services offered by the firm XCELHR listed at
http://www.xcelhr.com/BundledServices/ServiceGrid.aspx.
11
See for example Leah Vosko, “A New Approach to Regulating Temporary Agency Work in Ontario or Back to the
Future?,” 65(4) Relations Industrielles 632 (2010).
12
Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty And Profit (NY: Cosmo Classics, 1921).
13

Storrie, supra, note 1, at 33‐35. See also Steven Willborn, “Leased Workers: Vulnerability and the Need for
Special Legislation”, 19 Comparative Labor law and Policy Journal 85, (1997) and L.I. Smirnykh, Labour Leasing:
Economic Theory, EU and Russia Experience (Moscow: Russian‐European Centre for Economic Policy, 2005).
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firms. Examples include improved recruitment and screening functions, and regulatory
compliance capacity.14 Cost/risk pooling creates efficiencies in the provision of
insurance‐like benefits relating to health, welfare, injury compensation, and/or
retirement.15
b) Diversification of employment risk. This may be conceived as being essentially a specific
example of the economies of scale benefit in (a) above. Firms face both firm‐specific
and market risks when hiring workers. Staffing firms may face lower risks, given their
employment portfolios across multiple firms, of investing in employment.
c) Increased “flexibility” in two main forms. “Numerical” flexibility refers to firms’ ability
to adjust the number of workers utilized quickly. “Functional” flexibility refers to the
ability to adjust the configuration of skills available to the firm over time.16
d) “Matching” improvements: Through short term placements, the worker and user may
exchange information prior to committing to a lengthier employment relationship.17
While there remains significant space for normative concerns about triangular employment
despite these alleged benefits, there are also several points to consider in interpreting these
claims. First, it is important to remember that these claims are raised primarily in relation to
one specific variant of triangularity, namely temporary help services. However, much of the
potential underlying economic efficiency produced by temporary help services is rooted in its
temporal dimension, and not in its triangularity. This is the case for both notions of “flexibility”
described in (c) above as well as for the potential “matching” efficiencies referred to in (d),
both of which are commonly invoked in the literature and policy debates. These benefits relate
to a client firm’s ability to adjust either the numerical quantity, or qualitative nature, of the
labour power it requires over time. Flexibility is, in an ultimate sense, embedded in the
increased capacity for temporal adjustment, and the logical necessity of allowing triangular

14

See Gregory Hammond, “Flexible Staffing Trends and Legal Issues in the Emerging Workplace”, 10 The Labor
Lawyer 161 (1994). .
15
Storrie, supra, note 1; and Willborn, supra, note 33. In the USA, the National Association of Professional
Employer Organizations (“NAPEO”) cites these sorts of benefits flowing from its services. See list of “frequently
asked questions” at NAPEO website at http://www.napeo.org/peoindustry/faq.cfm
16
Storrie, supra, note 1.
17
Storrie, supra, note 1, at 34.
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employment to enable such flexibility gains, does not automatically or universally flow, and
remains a separate question for further analysis. Again, since triangular employment is in some
cases explicitly non‐temporary, triangularity per se cannot seemingly be justified by reference
to these conceptions of “flexibility,” and its justification must stand primarily on other grounds.
At a deeper theoretical level, in considering efficiency claims, it is crucial to take seriously the
precise nature of the service itself, in an ontological sense, embodied in such analysis. That is,
analysis must carefully isolate the actually‐existing or “concrete” staffing service provided, from
the law’s response to it, if any, to identify the efficiency. Here, it is possible that in certain
contexts, the imposition of de jure employer status may be (or appear to be) legally ‐ as
opposed to concretely – required, in order for the staffing service to produce the efficiency in
question.18 In such contexts, we are dealing with the product of prior policy choices and
existing legal arrangements, which are adjustable constructions. Arguably, a true “efficiency”
ought to be traceable to an underlying quality of the service itself, without entirely depending
upon prior policy choices or legal consequences of the arrangement for its existence. Relatedly,
the question of how de jure employer status is determined and the consequences of these rules
under different staffing service arrangements, should be conceived as occupying a separate
space, not implicated in (or constituting) the alleged efficiency produced by a given staffing
service. Any claims about efficiency gains that necessarily depend upon either the maintenance
of prior legal/policy choices, and/or that assume a specific accommodation of the law to the
service arrangement, are thus of a much weaker, or “second‐order” nature, since these
additional constraints on socially‐protective policy choices that these alleged efficiencies
require for their realization must be taken into account.19

18

A recent publication by NAPEO points out that in the U.S. legal context, in order for PEO firms to provide many of
the core services they provide (providing workers compensation insurance; sponsoring health insurance plans;
remitting income and unemployment taxes) they are legally required to be an “employer” in law. See Diane
Stanton, Rufus Wolff, and William J. Schilling, “Employer Status and the PEO Relationship,” 6 NAPEO Legal Review
1 (2008).
19
Theron makes an intuitively similar argument in the much more specific context of discussing the consequences
of the “fiction” enshrined in South African legislation of the temporary employment service as the de jure
employer. While he admits possible theoretical support for some benefits of temporary help services generally,
noting for example that some workers may prefer temporary work, Theron grasps the significant leap in logic,
stating “there is no apparent gain for them [those who prefer temporary work] in designating the TES as
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This also raises the question of the proper counterfactual to use in analyzing efficiency claims.
Wilborn recommends considering how the workers would be treated, ceteris peribus, in the
absence of the triangular arrangement.20 However, this suggests that in the counter‐factual
scenario employed, the larger status quo context is held constant. This is a rather limited
approach, and a more complete analysis requires consideration of potential alternative
legal/institutional arrangements. For example, in a separate article of mine(forthcoming),
examining triangular employment growth in the U.S. and Canada, the potential for certain
services to create economies of scale for U.S. client firms in health insurance provision is
accepted, given the specific background institutional context. However, the market for these
services is rooted in various pre‐existing policy choices in the regulation of employer‐sponsored
health care in the U.S., and the logic of that policy framework underpins the potentiality of
economies of scale from certain staffing services. Employing a more complete counterfactual
analysis, one should consider whether these efficiencies might be produced under alternative
organizational forms and/or contracting arrangements; whether existing law privileges the use
of triangular employment; and whether efficiency claims assume particular legal
responses/consequences.21 An example of this kind of analysis is found in Freeman and Gonos’
exploration of the case for regulating temporary help services, in which they compare the
regulation of temporary help with that of union hiring halls, a rival institution.22
Further, alleged benefits emerging from neoclassical theory may well be challenged on the
same grounds that the neoclassical model is critiqued in general, such as the institutionalist
employer”. See Jan Theron, “Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment
Relationship,” 26 Indus. L.J. Juta 618 (2005).
20

Willborn, Supra, note 33.
For example, some firms in the U.S. staffing industry are known as Administrative Services Organizations
(“ASO”s). These firms provide many of the same underlying services provided by Professional Employer
Organizations (“PEO”s), by contract. The key distinction between PEO and ASO service bundles however, seems to
be that under ASO contracting arrangements, the parties do not explicitly purport to contract for “co‐
employment”. In other words, they don’t attempt to claim an alteration in employer status of the underlying
workers as being a component of the service bundle. The existence of these alternative business practices in the
U.S. context clearly suggests that the legal effects of PEO arrangements form a significant independent benefit in
itself for U.S. client firms preferring these services over ASO services.
22
Harris Freeman and George Gonos, “Taming the Employment Sharks: The Case for Regulating Profit‐Driven Labor
Market intermediaries in High Mobility Labor Markets”, 13 Employee Rights and Employment Policy Journal 285
(2009).
21
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critique of that paradigm’s dependence upon micro‐level assumptions of (inter alia) a “perfect”
degree of information, mobility and rationality. Institutionalist intuition, with its emphasis on
so‐called “market failures” may be understood as forming the underlying intuition for some
existing critiques of triangular employment, and provides theoretical support for alternative,
and less benign, explanations for its expansion.23 For example, triangular employment relations
arguably exacerbate the degree of informational asymmetries in employment, as the true state
of authority, capacity, and responsibility allocation between the two “employing” entities
becomes increasingly unclear to the worker. These additional “transactions costs” imposed
upon workers in their initial/ongoing “bargaining” with their “employer(s)”, erode worker
bargaining power and capacity to enforce bargains.24 Likewise, information loss/costs may
reduce worker awareness of their extra‐contractual legal entitlements within the triangular
context. In a similar vein, the theoretical category of “unfree labour” increasingly applied to
temporary agency work(particularly as this overlaps with migration) highlights the importance
of contractually‐imposed mobility restrictions in triangular employment25
Further conceptualizations of triangular employment as a labour policy “problem” exist, drawn
from critical/Marxist (generically “critical”) literature. Although critical theory shares emphasis
with institutionalism on what the latter refers to generically as “information”, critical theory
provides other insights. Rooted in Marxist conceptions of the “labour process” there is a
deeper/broader rejection of the panoply of assumptions underlying neoclassical analysis than
institutionalism. The latter, it has been argued, commonly only penetrates a subset, or what
has been described as the “protective belt”, of such assumptions (re information and

23

The definitional boundary between the neoclassical and institutionalist paradigms are somewhat unclear in that
some ostensibly neoclassical analysis at times seeks to incorporate institutionalist critique into its domain.
Examples are neoclassical references to “market failure”, and so‐called neoclassical analysis based on the work of
Coase, which has elsewhere been cited as supporting the impossibility of fundamental tenets of neoclassical
analysis. See Bruce Kaufman, “The Impossibility of a Perfectly Competitive Labour Market,” 31 Cambridge Journal
Of Economics 775.
24
Here, we could conceive of the bargain as including legislated terms, since exacerbated informational problems
could extend to these. Of course, the impact of these various market failures or transactions costs may also affect
the ability of workers to engage in collective action, with these capacities being mediated by the applicable legal
framework for collective labour relations in the given jurisdiction.
25
Judy Fudge, and Kendra Strauss, Temporary Work, Agencies, and Unfree Labour: Insecurity in the New World of
Work (New York: Routledge, 2014).
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competition) while typically still adhering to certain “core” behavioural axioms (E.g. exogenous,
complete, fully ranked individual “preferences”) inherent in neoclassical analysis.26
In Marxist analysis, the labour process is the ultimate source of social exploitation and wealth
production, since it is only here that surplus value is produced. Further, the exploitive
tendencies of capitalist social relations may be reproduced partly because of their illusory form.
In particular the generalized “commodity form” of production, and the associated false
conception of labour (as opposed to “labour power”) as being a commodity, results in a
corrosive effect upon social consciousness, or what Marx famously refers to as the commodity
“fetish”, concealing from workers’ view the true nature of social relations around labour.27
Additional dynamics within capitalism contribute to its ongoing reproduction, and the
continued subordination of workers. These include the ability of the capitalist class to preserve
(or expand) worker commodification, and the essential, continuous presence of a reserve army
of labour.28
Extending Marx’s analysis into advanced capitalism in the modern era, critical theorists, many
following Gramsci, have examined processes of “hegemony”, and the construction of worker
“consent” to capitalist social relations.29 While the labour process remains understood as
objectively exploitive, critical theory emphasizes reliance upon other mechanisms, aside from
raw coercive force, in securing workers’ subjective consent. Burawoy, for example, emphasizes
the importance of what he calls the “mystification” characterizing advanced capitalism, and
particularly obfuscation within the labour process concealing the appropriation of surplus
value.30
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Thrainn Eggertson, Economic Behaviour And Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
See Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (1867), chapters 1‐3.
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For a summary of core elements of Marxist political economy’s conception of capitalist employment relations,
see Eric Tucker, “Renorming Labour Law: Can We Escape Labour Law’s Recurring Regulatory Dilemmas?” Industrial
Law Journal, Vol. 39, No. 2, June 2010.
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See Antonio Gramsci, Selections From The Prison Notebooks, (New York: International, 1971).
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Michael Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent: Changes In The Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1979); Michael Burawoy, “The Roots of Domination: Beyond Bourdieu and Gramsci”,
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In this vein, critical scholarship emphasizes the role of staffing arrangements in supporting
obfuscation in the labour process. Gonos argues that the business model of the modern
temporary help industry carries the historical and misleading conception that employment
agencies’ fees are “employer paid” to a heightened level. 31 Rather, modern temporary help
arrangements resurrect the historically banned practice of “fee splitting,” where employment
agencies charged workers fees for jobs and shared these profits with clients to induce a large‐
scale “churning” of workers. The modern U.S. temporary help formula, with the agency
designated the “employer”, provides a secure basis for a long‐term flow of fees, in the form of a
wage “mark‐up” charged throughout the entire “placement”.32 Misleading conceptions of the
service provided by the agency, and the ability to hide the true “markup”, makes the “service”
an instrument in intensifying surplus value extraction.33
Extending this critical theoretical approach, Smith’s analysis of temporary employment
relations in the U.S. illustrates how this process of concealment goes hand in hand with the
deepening of worker (and by extension working class) division and disorganization, and related
effects upon workers’ own consciousness, identities and aspirations.34 Although she is
specifically examining “temporary help” in the U.S., her analysis shows how triangular relations
may be constructed that, on the one hand allow for a sufficiently deep and seamless integration
of “temporary workers” (read: workers under triangular relations) into processes of production
and self‐governance in the workplace, while on the other destabilize workers understandings of
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George Gonos, “Never a Fee! The Miracle of Postmodern Temporary Help and Staffing Agency,” Working USA:
The Journal of Labor and Society Vol. 4, No.3 (Winter, 2000‐2001), 9‐36.
32
Ibid; George Gonos, “Fee‐Splitting Revisited: Concealing Surplus Value in the Temporary Employment
Relationship”, Politics and Society, Vol. 29, No.4, Dec 2001, 589‐611.
33
Or in even more explicitly Marxist terms, triangular employment may be a special commodity whose particular
“use value” is the ability to increase the rate of surplus value extraction in the labour process. Given the cost of
the agency markup to the client firm, this logic implicitly necessitates a decline in wages, or some other non‐wage
compensation, received by the worker. Gonos points to evidence of both wage loss under temporary staffing
arrangements, and to the increasingly normal practice of workers in these arrangements receiving no (or fewer)
health/welfare benefits in their employment compensation. See Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger, “The High
Pressure U.S. Labor Market of the 1990’s,” Working Paper No. 416, Princeton University Industrial Relations
Section, 1999, 43.
34
Vicki Smith, “The Fractured World of the Temporary Worker: Power, Participation, and Fragmentation in the
Contemporary Workplace”, Social Problems, Vol. 35 (Nov., 1998), pp. 411‐430.
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their employment status, limit and constrain their expectations, and distort their perceptions of
who possesses power or shares in their marginalized status.35
In critical theory then, triangularity generates unique behavioural effects leading to worker
(dis)empowerment at the level of the firm/organization, which may constitute an underlying
incentive/benefit to user firms. At a broader level, these effects also factor into the logics of
class construction, consciousness and solidarity, and into the balance of class forces. These
effects feed into prevailing ideological constructs and understandings, reciprocally affecting
micro level employment relations.
This review of some of the alternative theoretical perspectives on triangular employment
suggests that there is significant space and grounds for accepting the claim that triangular
employment growth represents a policy “problem”, regardless of whether we accept the
potential for certain efficiencies, in certain contexts. It remains conceivable that a large part of
the benefit of some services flows not necessarily from any fundamental or concrete efficiency,
but rather flows from favorable legal consequences of the triangular employment relationship
that the staffing service constructs or necessitates, or from ensuing shifts in relational power.
In the real world of imperfect legal/policy instruments, the possibility of benefits flowing from
what I refer to as a regulatory differential entering into the mix of benefits facing the user firm,
is quite feasible. Existing literature on certain staffing services, like temporary help, points to
such effects36 suggesting that user firms gain such benefits, at least as byproducts from the
service. This reinforces the importance of more carefully examining the relationship between
triangular employment growth and the particularities of labour law in a given jurisdiction, the
unpacking of which is the subject of the next section.
IV.

“Regulatory Differentials” Across Alterative Employment Forms

As discussed above, the claim that triangular employment relations may undermine the
function of labour/employment law is not a new one. Much analysis implies that triangular
35

Ibid.
See for example the summaries of labour policy problems arising from temporary help agency employment
provided in Vosko, Temporary Work, supra, note 1; Peck and Theodore, Temped Out?, supra, note 1; Bartkiw, Baby
Steps?, supra, note 1.
36
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employment enables firms to “avoid” or “escape” the law or its effects, and it is also suggested
that as the burden of employment regulation grows, firms increasingly use triangular relations
in response..37 But arguably, our understanding of how triangular employment enables
avoidance is incomplete. Indeed, in some accounts, the process of “shifting” employer status
onto a 3rd party staffing firm seems to be improperly understood as being synonymous with
regulatory avoidance.
Here the U.S. case is informative. One of the most important explanations for the historical
expansion in temporary help services in the U.S., and how this process is rooted in struggles
over legal regulation, is found in the work of Gonos.38 Gonos traces how temporary help firms
were successful in a lengthy lobbying campaign throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s over
constructing its status as a new type of labour market intermediary. On the one hand, the
industry was able to distinguish itself from the historical legal category of “employment
agency”, largely winning for itself exemptions from pre‐existing regulations on these sorts of
firms. Moreover, the industry gradually also succeeded in obtaining recognition of its member
firms as the de jure “employers” of the workers they assign to client users for temporary work.
As an early step, the industry convinced levels of government to accept unemployment
insurance and payroll tax remittances concerning “its” employees, establishing the staffing firm
as the de jure employer for such purposes. The industry was then successful in gradually
extending the domain within which its status as de jure employer was recognized over time.
Gonos argues that user firms’ increasing ability to count on the staffing firm’s de jure employer
status became a crucial factor in stimulating demand for these services. He argues that this
“temporary help formula” constituted a major deregulatory shift in the U.S. beginning in the
1970’s.
While Gonos’ contribution is important, his argument about deregulation ends with the
construction of the temporary help formula and the shift in de jure employer status to the
staffing firm. The more specific details about how this shift in de jure employer status achieved
37

David Autor, “Outsourcing at Will: Unjust Dismissal Doctrine and the Growth of Temporary Help Employment,”
23 Journal Of Labor Economics 1 (2003).
38
See Gonos, “The Contest over ‘Employer’ Status in the Postwar United States: The Case of Temporary Help
Firms,” 31 Law And Society Review 81 (1997).
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such a deep deregulatory effect, and the scope or limits of this shift, are not articulated. Some
subsequent literature cites Gonos’ work as seemingly confirming the benefit of regulatory
avoidance via the shift in de jure employer status.39 The implicit assumption that a shift in de
jure employer status is synonymous with regulatory avoidance also seems to underlay some
comparative analysis of triangular growth across jurisdictions,40 and the theory that the greater
the regulatory burden imposed by labour law in a given jurisdiction, the greater will be the use
of triangular employment, as firms increasingly seek to avoid regulatory burden.41 Again,
neither the precise mechanisms nor the limits of this avoidance are clear.
In reality, the victory of the U.S. temporary help industry in achieving de jure employer status,
and thus regulatory avoidance, remains somewhat incomplete and contested. Employer status
in these contexts is generally determined on an ad hoc basis. Legal tests for determining the de
jure employer continue to be based on the primacy of fact, and common law tests in the U.S.
have in most recent years depended substantially upon indicators of “control”.42 Thus, in
contexts where control over workers assigned by a staffing firm is severely lacking, de jure
employer status may be reserved to the user.43 Further, de jure employer status is not
necessarily robust across policy sub‐fields or regimes, meaning that status may be allocated
differently by adjudicators in different regimes or contexts. For example, the capture of de jure
employer status for staffing firms under payroll tax rules does not guarantee a similar outcome
for the purposes of minimum employment standards, collective labour relations, or workers
compensation regimes, since variation may remain among the application of the common law
tests across adjudicators within specific subfields.44
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See for example the references to Gonos’ work in Peck and Theodore, Temped Out, supra, note 1.
Mitlacher, supra, note 1.
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See Autor, supra, note 37.
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Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Robert T. Darden 503 US 318; 112 SCt. 1344 (1992). (“Darden”).
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This is not to say that a user and supplier firm might not be able to operate taking the contrary position in
practice. This might be the case because of lack of enforcement, informational deficiencies, and other factors
affecting the relative power of the parties under triangular employment. I refer to these factors collectively as
“informal regulatory differentials” in my subsequent discussion, infra.
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For example, one remaining distinction is that adjudicators under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which primarily
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Moreover, even where de jure employer status does shift to the staffing firm, avoidance of
regulatory effect is neither obvious nor universal. Where the staffing firm becomes the de jure
employer, it then commonly becomes subject to the normal range of employer obligations in
law, such as they are, within the jurisdiction. Here, the question remains why regulatory effect
imposed instead on the staffing firm would not hold, and/or why its effects would not be
internalized within the staffing service contractual arrangement, and transferred back to the
user, as part of a rational contracting exercise. As a very simple example, suppose that
employment law universally requires a minimum wage of $10 per hour. This same rule would
apply regardless of whether the user or provider is the de jure employer. In the latter case, the
provider would be required to pay the minimum wage, and we would expect it to charge the
user for this mandated labour cost, plus markup. From the user’s perspective here, regulation
is formally equivalent across employment forms; there is no regulatory gap as between the
employment forms. Note that the same outcome would seem to hold regardless of the size of
the minimum wage imposed, so that either a $10 or $15 minimum wage would be similarly
equivalent in effect across employment forms, there being no obvious regulatory gap to exploit
from the triangular employment form in either case.
Overall then, despite fairly widespread acceptance of the basic intuition that a shift in de jure
employer status enables user firms to avoid regulatory effects, these effects are neither
universal nor boundless, and such claims require further articulation of how regulatory
avoidance occurs, and the mechanisms at work in this process.45
To this end, a more helpful concept in grasping the relationship between regulation and
triangular employment growth is the concept of a regulatory differential, meaning a differential
effect of regulation that occurs across employment forms. These regulatory differentials alter

remitting payroll taxes, the IRS additionally employs quite a different concept referred to as the “statutory
employer” or the “section 3401(d)(1) employer”, based on identifying the party with the “control of the payment
of wages”. See IRC section 3401(d)(1), and see IRS, Internal Revenue Manual Part 5.1.24 “Third‐Party Payer
Arrangements for Employment Taxes”, at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05‐001‐024r.html. Mere status as a
“section 3401(d)(1) employer” for tax purposes would not necessarily translate into common law employer status
in a different institutional context.
45
For a discussion of some specific examples of user firm cost avoidance under triangular employment, see
Davidov, supra, note 14.
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the effects of law upon actors, creating incentives for users to shift to triangular employment in
certain contexts. It follows that in assessing the relationship between law and triangular
employment growth, what is required is an extensive analysis of law with a view to
deconstructing regulatory differentials embedded within the law or legal regime overall,
creating an ultimate benefit for the user.46 This analytical approach is required to assess the
relationship between law and triangular employment growth within a single jurisdiction, and
provides a framework for comparative analysis of law and triangular employment growth
across jurisdictions. Here, a broad conception of the nature of law is necessary, recognizing
the importance not only of explicit rules but of implied ones as well, establishing not only
formal “rights” of parties, but also the various privileges, powers and immunities (as articulated
in Hohfeld’s famous typology),47 shaped by the overall configuration and interaction of explicit
and implicit rules, and patterns of enforcement.
There exists a range of ways in which existing legal configurations and enforcement practices
(collectively forming a legal “regime”) create unequal regulatory effects across employment
forms, which are potential determinants of triangular employment growth in a given
jurisdiction. The multiple ways in which some element of the legal regime overall might
constitute a regulatory differential may be categorized according to the different types of
mechanisms involved. The following taxonomy of regulatory differentials outlines some of
these different mechanisms at play in a given jurisdiction.
1. Formal regulatory differentials. Some aspect of the legal regime may formally (I.e. explicitly)
mandate some differential treatment as between direct and triangular employment, in some
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Somewhat similar understanding of this more complex relationship between law and triangular employment
growth is illustrated in the work of Peck and Theodore, who in their comparative analysis of staffing industry
growth across jurisdictions point out that the industry is highly active in both less and more regulated countries.
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W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied In Legal Reasoning (New Haven: Yale University Press,
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respect.48 These formal distinctions in treatment across employment forms may be further
categorized as embodying either a pro‐regulatory or de‐regulatory thrust with respect to
triangular employment,49 with corresponding expected effects on triangular employment
growth.
Examples of de‐regulatory formal differentials include:

A. Lower minimum labour standards for workers in triangular employment. These could take a
variety of forms, and could reflect a degree of deviation from certain prevailing standards,
or outright exemptions from them, and may vary in their salience.50
B. Formal rules affecting the capacity of workers in triangular employment to engage in
collective labour relations. These may include restrictions on workers’ eligibility to
participate in collective bargaining at certain levels, or in concert with other workers, or
other rules affecting the particularities of participation by workers in triangular
employment. Examples are rules on whether workers under triangular employment may
join particular types of “bargaining units”, particularly in jurisdictions utilizing a variant of
the U.S. “Wagner model” for labour relations.51 A particularly bald example of this sort of
regulatory differential in the U.S. context is the rule established by the 2004 decision of the
National Labor Relations Board in Oakwood Care Centre, which essentially bars temporary
help workers from joining combined bargaining units containing direct‐hire employees. 52
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Since this paper has attempted to analytically isolate employer status rules from underlying regulatory
differentials, statutory provisions that allocate “employer” status to one of the parties are prima facie not included
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Pro‐regulatory differentials, which may be conceived as remedying somewhat the effects of
other differentials, must of course also be taken into account in analysis overall. Examples of
pro‐regulatory formal differentials include:
A. Restrictions on the use of triangular employment in particular circumstances. These could
include the enumeration of circumstances for its allowable use,53 or measures that effectively
amount to taxes imposed on triangular employment designed to discourage its use.
B. Revised minimum labour standards for workers in triangular employment. Differentials
might be premium worker entitlements imposed upon triangular employment, as a remedial
measure.54 Another common example of these rules are the additional informational
obligations and notice entitlements for workers in triangular employment, which may be
conceived of as addressing some of the starkest issues around information deficiencies
discussed in the literature review above.55
C. Special rules aimed at addressing the comparable treatment of directly employed workers
from those under triangular employment. These include provisions relating to the principle of
“equal treatment” or non‐discrimination” at the firm level.56
D. Special rules addressing the ability of workers in triangular employment to engage in
collective labour relations. These could include revisions to collective labour relations
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Storrie, supra, note 1, describes the use of these restrictions in certain EU jurisdictions.
An example of these rules is the requirement in France that temporary agencies pay the worker a lump sum of
money at the end of the assignment, in addition to the wage, and dependent upon whether the worker is offered
another assignment, referred to in literature as “precarity pay”. See Vosko, “Legitimizing”, supra note 72.
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(FLA. STAT.ANN. s. 31.448.20 to 31.448.25) and in its regulations for “employee leasing companies” (FLA.
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regulation with respect to workers in triangular employment, or the construction of particular
frameworks for their purposes.57

2. Contingent regulatory differentials: Here, the law does not formally impose a different
regulatory treatment as between direct and triangular employment. However, law does
formally provide for a distinction in some sort of regulatory treatment of an “employer”, which
treatment is contingent on some other measurable circumstance, the occurrence of which may
be influenced by the use of triangular employment. Important examples of these are the
numerical thresholds of various sorts, where the number of “employees” of a firm determines
the impact or applicability of a particular rule.58 These contingent differentials may at times
appear in a simple “headcount” form. However, they may also take a more complex form,
involving calculations and/or comparisons of numerical quantities of employees, or sub‐
categories of employees, along with related rules for measuring quantities, characteristics, or
qualities, of these employee categories.59 Other examples of these may be based on
measurements of aggregate employment budgets or expenditures. Measurements of this sort
have been increasingly applied as a governance tool in public administration in recent decades
as part of austerity measures and/or new public management techniques, coinciding with
triangular employment growth in the public sphere.60 In some forms, the use of triangular
57
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Ontario that a firm have at least 50 employees in order for employee entitlements to “emergency leave” to apply.
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employment to shift the de jure employer status of only a subset of an organization’s workers
may produce a revised regulatory effect affecting a larger group of workers, including direct‐
hire employees.61

3. Informal regulatory differentials: Assuming that the various remaining components of the
legal regime formally apply consistently across employment forms, for various potential
reasons, the de facto regulatory effect of law is not perfectly robust across the two employment
forms. Without using this terminology, academic literature and ILO Reports have identified
numerous sorts of informal or sociological effects of triangularity on the efficacy of labour law.
An important concern here is how triangularity impacts regulatory enforcement, considered
here as occurring through various sorts of causal pathways, although the concept should be
considered as referring not only to enforcement activities themselves but to a broader set of
ways in which triangularity may influence actor behavior, itself mediated by regulation.
Institutionalist and Critical theoretical perspectives on triangular employment growth reviewed
earlier in this paper provide the foundational logic for understanding this category of regulatory
differentials in particular, since these explanations do not necessarily depend upon the specific
configuration of rules within the legal regime. Thus, we may conceive of their being informal
regulatory differentials embedded throughout the legal regime, to the extent that the use of
triangular employment within that regime produces, unmitigated by the regime, any of the
following conditions:

Quan, Yan Dong, and Ye Jingyi, “Rethinking the Labour Contract Law of China,” paper presented to the Labour Law
Research Network conference, Barcelona, June 2013. Anecdotal evidence suggests that various headcount rules
binding SOEs are a key factor driving this very recent trend.
61

For example, in the U.S. case discussed above, the use of triangular employment to effect a change in status
under U.S. tax law’s benefit plan rules, may cause effects experienced by direct hire employees in the degree of
regulatory protection they receive with respect to benefit provision.
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A. Triangularity increases worker confusion and obfuscation over formal allocation of employer
responsibilities as between the user and provider.
B. Triangularity increases the cost/burden on workers in seeking to (re)negotiate terms and
conditions of work.
C. Triangularity increases the cost/burden on workers in seeking enforcement of their formal
rights and standards.
D. Triangularity increases the regulatory cost/burden on local authorities in the enforcement of
their law/policy domain.
E. Triangularity may affect workers’ self‐ identity, expectations, social interaction, and
solidarity.

Informal regulatory differentials are thus a fairly broad and fluid category of phenomena. Given
their seemingly low dependence upon the specificity of labour law, it follows that they likely
exist, even if only in latent form, in most (if not all) jurisdictions having a regulated labour
market. In other words, each regulated labour market contains internally the seeds of this
third potential source of triangular employment growth, to varying degrees, mediated by other
domestic social and organizational factors. Thus, because of the existence of informal
regulatory differentials, absent explicit remedial policy measures (pro‐regulatory formal
differentials, discussed above), triangular employment growth may take root, to some degree,
in virtually any regulated labour market. This is not to say, of course, that the benefits and
costs of triangular employment will in any given context necessarily align to this result. The
point is rather simply that because of the nature of this 3rd category of regulatory differentials,
there is a generalized potential benefit for users ranging in size across different contexts, and
thus a widespread potential source of triangular employment growth. This category then, helps
explain why we observe triangular employment growth of some degree across so many
different jurisdictions, with a wide range of formally disparate labour law regimes.62
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To complete this analytical framework concerning the relationship between labour law and
triangular employment growth, the importance of the prevailing employer status rules in a
given jurisdiction must be taken into account. In this analytical framework, employer status
rules should be understood as serving a sort of bridging or gate‐keeping function. That is, the
particulars of employer status rules affect the possibility, and thus the regularity or degree, of
shifting de jure employer status from a user to a staffing firm – and thereby accessing the
available regulatory differential(s). Assuming a given degree of regulatory differentials for
access in a given jurisdiction, the easier (or more likely) it is to achieve a shift in de facto
employer status, and the greater will be the expected benefit from triangular employment.
Thus, employer status rules in a given jurisdiction mediate the relationship between regulatory
differentials and triangular employment growth in that jurisdiction. Although they do not
themselves constitute the underlying source of benefit to the user, and their effect on
triangular employment growth is inherently interactive with regulatory differentials separately
defined, employer status rules remain an important independent variable in the relationship
between law and triangular employment growth in a given jurisdiction.

V.

Concluding Thoughts

The goal of this paper was to contribute to our understanding of growth in triangular
employment relations embedded in staffing services, by examining its relationship with labour
law. The review of how triangular employment growth may be understood from alternative
theoretical perspectives shed light on the potentially problematic nature of this growth. At a
minimum, I have hopefully articulated some important limits to which certain theoretical
explanations for triangular employment growth, rooted in beliefs about benign “efficiency”, can
be used to dismiss such concerns.
Further, understanding of the relationship between labour law and triangular employment
growth has hopefully been furthered by the introduction of the concept of a regulatory
differential; the articulation of the different forms these may take in the typology provided; and
the analytical clarification of the relationship between these phenomena and employer status
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rules within a jurisdiction. It is hoped that the framework provided helps clarify the types of
analysis required in uncovering the relationship between triangular employment growth and
domestic labour law.
This analytical framework may also serve as an improved lens for comparative analysis of
triangular employment growth across jurisdictions. Informed by this framework, comparative
analysis would likely reduce its emphasis on uncovering regulatory diversity or differences in
relevant rule categories around triangular employment (and its variants)63 and on seeking
growth patterns across jurisdictions based on notions of their being “more” or “less”
employment regulation in a jurisdiction. Rather, comparative analysis would be increasingly
anchored in what might be considered a “difference of differences” approach. This involves an
extensive review of labour law, across sub‐fields, towards uncovering the degree to which it
embodies regulatory differentials in different forms that may help explain observed triangular
employment growth dynamics.64 The extent to which the existence of regulatory differentials
helps to explain triangular employment growth is important for policy analysis, since it
challenges the conception of such growth as being the natural (and necessary) product of
efficiency‐enhancing market activities, and helps illuminate the space for alternative labour
policy choices.
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See for example Silvia Spattini, “Agency Work: A Comparative Analysis”, 1 E‐Journal Of International and
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Com. 431 (2000).
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27

Paper # 2: Timothy J. Bartkiw, “Regulatory Differentials and Triangular
Employment Growth in the U.S. and Canada”, Employee Rights and Employment
Policy Journal, vol. 19, Issue 1, 2015 (forthcoming).
I. Introduction:
Over the past few decades, there has been substantial growth in the global “staffing” industry,
with considerable variation in its growth across different jurisdictions.1 This industry provides a
range of employment related services2 under different labels, supplementing or displacing
employment functions performed by “user” firms. Coinciding with this has been growth in
“triangular employment.” In a triangular employment relationship,3 functions traditionally
performed by a single employer are distributed across a “user” firm and a service “provider”
firm such that a non‐trivial, objective question exists about the appropriateness4 of the
allocation of employer status and corresponding rights, obligations, or liabilities in the
relationship.5 Triangular employment is not a juridical employment category, nor a recognized
employment form identified in “official” data. Rather, it is a theoretical concept capturing
particular policy concerns, including how these types of employment relationships enable a
shift in bargaining power and potential erosion in working conditions, in the employment
1

Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore and Kevin Ward, Constructing Markets for Temporary Labour: Employment
Liberalization and the Internationalization of the Staffing Industry, 5 GLOBAL NETWORKS 3(2005). See also
DONALD STORRIE, TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Luxembourg: Office for the Publications of the European
Communities, 2002).
2
The use of the term “services” is not meant to attribute any particular degree of legitimacy to such business
transactions. It has been argued that promulgating the broader “staffing services” label was part of the historical
transformation of the temporary help industry into lateral, related services and part of its effort to consolidate its
legitimacy in light of its previously stable, yet paradoxical, regulatory regime. See LEAH F. VOSKO, TEMPORARY
WORK: THE GENDERED RISE OF A PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (2000), 137‐156. See also the
discussion of the historical expansion of related services in Robert Parker, FLESH PEDDLERS AND WARM BODIES:
THE TEMPORARY HELP INDUSTRY AND ITS WORKERS (1994) at 40‐42.
3
Importantly, unlike in some other kinds of relationships involving work, in triangular employment there is “an”
employment relationship alleged to exist along at least one of the sides of the triangle.
4
Here I am not simply considering the question of whether employer status has been allocated under actually
existing employer status rules, which vary across jurisdictions. Rather, I also include in this category relationships
in which the application of actually‐existing employer status rules, such as they are, result in objective policy
concerns about the appropriateness of the allocation of employer status.
5
For a somewhat similar attempt to define this phenomenon, see International Labour Conference, Report V(1):
Scope of the Employment Relationship, International Labour Conference, 95th Session, 2006, p. 13.
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relationship.6 It is a previously well‐established concern that certain staffing services may
generate triangular employment,7 although not every staffing service should be understood as
doing so. For example, in both the U.S. and Canadian contexts, it is fairly clear that firms merely
providing “payroll” services to user firms, and nothing more, do not produce triangular
employment as understood in this analysis. On the other hand, certain other services embody
a contrived attempt to alter employer status allocation, away from the user firm, explicitly
embraced as a part, or consequence, of the service provided.
Different types of staffing services vary within both a temporal and a qualitative dimension.8
Some services are designed to be short term,9 while others are semi‐permanent
arrangements.10 While temporality may “matter” in the construction of triangular
employment, the main determinant, based on the definition used in this paper, would seem to
be the qualitative nature of the services provided, and the overall resulting (re)allocation of
employment functions across the user and staffing firm. In the U.S. and Canada, the two most
salient examples of services that appear prima facie to generate triangular employment are
“temporary help”11 (short term) and “professional employer” (long term) services.12

6

Peck and Theodore argue that growth in temporary agency employment itself has contributed to a generalized
deregulation of the employment relationship itself. See Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, Flexible Recession: The
Temporary Staffing Industry and Mediated Work in the United States, 31(2) CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
171. (2007).
7
Triangular employment also exists in other contexts, such as in certain subcontracting arrangements. See
International Labour Conference, Id..
8
See Timothy J. Bartkiw, Labour Law and Triangular Employment Growth: A Theory of Regulatory Differentials,
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (forthcoming).
9
Short term services include “temporary help,” “day labor,” and “temp to perm” services.
10
More common long term services are “employee leasing” or “professional employer” service. Of course, in
practice there are also deviations in temporality from what the service bundle “label” implies. The growth in so‐
called “perma‐temp” arrangements is a key example of this. See ERIN HATTON, THE TEMP ECONOMY: FROM
KELLY GIRL TO PERMATEMPS IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2011). Other evidence of increasing duration of assignments
in so‐called temporary help arrangements is also provided in VOSKO, supra note 2. See also Matt Vidal and Leann
M. Tigges, Temporary Employment and Strategic Staffing in the Manufacturing Sector, 48 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
55 (2009).
11
Other labels are used to identify similar service bundles elsewhere, such as the use of the term “labor broker”
services in South Africa. See Jan Theron, Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular
Employment Relationship, 26 INDUS. L.J. JUTA 618 (2005).
12
Another label used for a particular long term service arrangement (historically used somewhat interchangeably
with the “professional employer” service label) is that of “employee leasing” services. See the discussion in
EDWARD A. LENZ, CO‐EMPLOYMENT: EMPLOYER LIABILITY ISSUES IN THIRD‐PARTY STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS, 7TH
ED. ( 2011). As Lenz points out, the term “employee leasing” is sometimes used as a generic term to refer to all
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There already exists an extensive literature about the various policy concerns arising out of the
growth in temporary help services in the past few decades.13 On the other hand, there has
been far less analysis, let alone awareness, of the growth in “professional employer” services in
the U.S.A. recently.14 A PEO service arrangement involves the contractual provision of a various
employment related services, usually on a long term basis, typically without the actual labor
supply component typifying the “temporary help” concept. Through these arrangements, the
PEO and its client purport to construct what in the U.S. is commonly referred to as a “co‐
employment” relationship. The National Association of Professional Employer Organizations
(“NAPEO”), the key industry association for “professional employer” organizations, (“PEOs”),
explicitly embraces “co‐employment” as being at the heart of its member firms’ services.15 “Co‐
employment” is a term created by the PEO industry; it is not a juridical category, and is arguably
ambiguous.16 In PEO services, the service contract outlines the basis of co‐employment,
involving a (re)allocation of employment functions and responsibilities, and the parties’
intended assumptions of employer liability in relation to specific aspects of labor regulation.
This paper traces growth patterns in temporary help and PEO services in the U.S. and Canada,
and links them to specific characteristics of regulation, illustrating that certain characteristics of
labor law in the two jurisdictions help explain these growth patterns. Various forms of
“regulatory differentials” are important contributors to triangular employment growth.17
Regulatory differentials are differences in regulatory effect, under existing regulation, that

forms of staffing services. However, it is more often (and here) understood to refer to an intricate human resource
outsourcing arrangement that purports to transfer employer status to the employee leasing firm, which in more
recent years have become increasingly referred to as “professional employer organizations”. The fact that
employee leasing services themselves are not generally short term arrangements, ought not to be confused with
the fact that the de jure definition of a so‐called “leased employee”, a concept used in U.S. tax law and discussed in
significant detail infra, is partly based on the duration of services provided by the worker in question. See Internal
Revenue Code, s. 414(n).
13
See Bartkiw, supra note 8; VOSKO, supra note 2; STORRIE, supra note 1; and HATTON, supra note 10. See also
Harris Freeman and George Gonos, Regulating the Employment Sharks: Reconceptualizing the Legal Status of the
Commercial Temp Agency, 8 WORKINGUSA: THE JOURNAL OF LABOR AND SOCIETY 293 (2005).
14
Britton Lombardi and Yukako Ono, Professional Employer Organizations: What are they, who uses them, and why
should we care?, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 2 (2008).
15
See NAPEO website description of co‐employment at http://www.napeo.org/peoindustry/coemployers.cfm.
16
Thus, employer status in these arrangements would be determined by prevailing employer status rules and,
typically, the primacy of fact.
17
Bartkiw, supra, note 7.
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occur across direct and triangular employment forms, from the ultimate perspective of the
user.18 In various ways and contexts, they create incentives stimulating the use of triangular
employment. In this framework, there are three conceptually separate categories of regulatory
differentials. First, “formal differentials” are differences in effect flowing from explicit formal
distinctions in law applied as between direct and triangular employment. Second, “contingent
differentials” are regulatory differences contingent on the occurrence of some other particular
fact or state formally specified in the law, the occurrence (or not) of which may be affected by
the use of triangular employment (e.g. so‐called employee “head count” rules). Third,
“informal differentials” are de facto differences in regulatory effect, despite formal consistency
of law across the two employment forms.19 Further, while existing regulatory differentials
represent potential benefits available to user firms, user firm access to these benefits is further
complicated and mediated by the domestic regime of employer status rules, since they
determine the feasibility and costs involved in shifting employer status away from the user. In
other words, given a certain potential benefit, employer status rules mediate the expected
benefit of triangular employment.20 This theoretical approach allows for certain analytical gains
in isolating the effects of employer status rules from underlying regulatory differentials
themselves, in explaining triangular employment growth, and in comparative analysis of this
growth across jurisdictions.
The remainder of this paper applies this theoretical framework, to help explain triangular
employment growth patterns in the U.S. and Canada in recent decades, by doing the following.
First, data analysis provided in the next section shows that there has not only been substantial
growth in triangular employment in the U.S. and Canada in recent decades, but that there has
also been significantly greater growth in the U.S.. Second, legal analysis is provided to show
that certain key regulatory differentials have existed in the U.S., which were effectively absent
in Canada, and that the size of these regulatory differentials was magnified by legislative
developments over this time period. Here the legal analysis provided is limited to two key sub‐
fields of labor law: employee pensions law and employer‐sponsored health benefits law. Third,
18

Id..
Id..
20
Id..
19
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further legal analysis is provided to show that differences in employer‐status rules in the U.S.
and Canada were also consistent with this theoretical framework, such that user firm access to
underlying regulatory differentials was comparably greater in the U.S..

II. Staffing Services & Triangular Employment Growth in Canada and the U.S.:
This section reviews official data illustrating growth in temporary help services and professional
employer services, the two main staffing services generating triangular employment in Canada
and the U.S.. Official definitions of staffing industry statistical categories have been adjusted
over time to attempt to distinguish between different services.21
From 1980‐1997, official data was organized based on the Standard Industrial Classification
(1980) system of industry categories, which included an industry category called “Employment
Agencies and Personnel Suppliers”, comprised of the two subcategories “Employment
Agencies” and “Personnel Suppliers”, with the latter being the relevant category for our
purposes for this period.22 In 1997, Canada and the U.S. adopted the NAICS industrial
classification system, redefining the industry into one large category called “Employment
Services”, with three subcategories: “Employment Placement Agencies”, “Temporary Help
Services,” and “Employee Leasing Services,” the latter being the historical precursor to
professional employer services. In 2002, the industry subcategory “Employee Leasing Services”
was renamed “Professional Employer Services”, mirroring the “rebranding” of this sub‐industry
in the U.S..23

21

Canada, the U.S. and Mexico have since at least 1997 used the North American Industrial Classification System
for classifying official statistics. In certain instances, efforts have been made to “recode” some earlier data based
on NAICS, to create longer time series for comparisons. The degree to which official categorization reflects actual
practice is undoubtedly somewhat limited. In an interview, a president of a large Canadian staffing firm stated
that there is not a strong understanding of the concept of “PEO” services in Canada, despite this being an official
category used by Statistics Canada. Official statistics, reviewed in Part V of the paper, suggest that there is (at
most) a very small volume of such services supplied in Canada.
22
Employment Agencies focused primarily on matching and recruitment services, and lacked triangular
employment relations.
23
The only subsequent change in definitions of these industry categories took place in 2007, when the 56131
Employment Placement Agencies title was changed to Employment Placement Agencies and Executive Search
Services, to clarify that the latter form of search and matching services fell under this category. Despite the
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Table 1: Employment in Employment Services Industry, Canada, 1982‐2009, Thousands
Year
SIC 771 Employment
Agencies and
Personnel Suppliers
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

33.4
38.3
46.7
49.1
53.9
59.8
71.7
63.6
54.1
45.7
59.7
69
79.4
92.3

% of Aggregate
Employment
0.303
0.339
0.401
0.409
0.437
0.471
0.552
0.486
0.421
0.359
0.467
0.528
0.597
0.688

NAICS 5613
Employment % Agg.
Services

58.0
48.7
60.3
72.6
84.9
98.3
108.5
117.8
126.3
132.5
144.2
145.0
146.2
162.2
169.5
183.3
183.8
179.8
151.4

0.451
0.382
0.471
0.556
0.639
0.732
0.792
0.838
0.877
0.897
0.965
0.947
0.933
1.017
1.048
1.112
1.090
1.050
0.899

Source: Survey of Employment, Payroll and Hours.

Table 1 contains data on employment24 levels in the aggregate “employment services” industry
in Canada for years 1982‐2009. The data reveal some important trends. First, it is clear from

adoption of these new categories, there is very limited data on the PEO sub‐category in Canada, because of its
extremely small size. For example, there is no reliable annual data series on the number of Canadian workers
“employed” in this sub‐industry.
24
Employment levels reported for these industries would include staff directly employed and working in staffing
services firm administration. Nevertheless, the vast bulk of employment reported in these statistics represents
workers assigned to clients, and thus most prior literature uses this as one potential proxy for employment levels
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the figures in columns 1 and 3 that employment in the industry grew substantially in Canada
from 1983 to its peak in 2007. Further, as shown by the calculations in columns 2 and 4, this
industry’s employment growth was disproportionately greater than aggregate employment
growth in Canada, and thus the industry’s share of aggregate employment levels similarly
experienced a growth trend up until 2005, after which its employment share has declined
slightly. Available data does not allow us to decompose these employment levels in Canada
across industry subcategories, so they are used as the best available proxy for measuring
underlying employment growth in temporary help arrangements, as done in prior analysis.25
Despite the clear growth trend, based on the measures employed in Canadian official data, the
industry’s share of aggregate employment peaked at about 1.1% in 2006.
Table 2 presents data on employment levels for the U.S. employment services industry for this
same period. The U.S. data similarly confirms a substantial employment growth trend from
1982 to 2009, although it does not reveal a comparable peak level. Other important contrasts
with Canadian trends also exist. First, the U.S. employment services industry overall appears to
be relatively much larger than the Canadian, measured as a share of aggregate employment.
Further, until approximately 2000, there was a positive trend in the temporary help sub‐
industry’s share of aggregate employment, but this share subsequently stabilized, or peaked.26
This trend up to, and peak at, the year 2000, is confirmed by both the CES and CBP data sources
on the U.S. industry. U.S. data also reveals that despite this bounded growth in temporary help,
the combined staffing industry’s overall employment share nevertheless continued to grow,
due to remarkable growth in employment levels in the “professional employer” sub‐industry.
The CBP data series reveals that employment in this sub‐industry grew from approximately 436
thousand employees in 1988 to about 2.07 million employees in 2008, a remarkable growth
rate of 374% over two decades!
and growth. Since data may be affected significantly by variations in assignment length, industry revenues are also
used as a helpful additional proxy.
25
See for example LEAH VOSKO, MANAGING THE MARGINS (2010); and Leah Vosko, A New Approach to
Regulating Temporary Agency Work in Ontario or Back to the Future?, 65 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 632 (2010).
26
Peck and Theodore similarly discuss an upper limit to the growth in the proportionate size of the temporary help
industry (without analyzing the other components of the staffing industry) in Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore,
Temped Out? Industry Rhetoric, Labour Regulation, and Economic Restructuring in the Temporary Staffing
Business, 23(2) ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 143 (May 2002).
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Confirmation of these patterns is provided by separate data on industry revenues, a proxy for
the market value of labor supplied under these service arrangements. Table 3 provides data on
operating revenue for the employment services industry category in Canada from 1982 to 2010,
along with a breakdown of the allocation of these revenues across the industry subcategories
beginning in 1998. By the year 1998, the first year for which an annual breakdown across sub‐
categories is available, temporary help services constituted the largest share of industry
revenues, by far, at 81%. This distribution of industry revenues remained fairly stable, with
some variation through 1998‐2005, after which the temporary help share seems to have
declined, while the share owing to employment placement and executive search services
increased somewhat.
Table 2 – Employment in Employment Services Industry, U.S.A., 1982‐2008, Thousands.
SIC 736 Personnel
Supply % Agg.

7361 Employment
Agencies % Agg.

7363 Help Supply
Services % Agg.

5613 Employment
Services % Agg.

56131 Employment
Placemen % Agg.

56132 Temporary
Help
% Agg.

Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

541
618.6
796.7
890.7
990.2
1176.8
1350.4
1454.5
1534.5
1484.5
1629.3
1906.1
2271.7
2475.5
2653.5
2985
3278.1
3615.8
3883.4
3446
3169.4

0.6
0.69
0.84
0.91
1
1.15
1.28
1.35
1.4
1.37
1.5
1.72
1.99
2.11
2.22
2.43
2.6
2.8
2.95
2.61
2.42

124
130.5
154.2
158.7
153.7
187.9
224.5
238.8
246.4
216
218.6
237
254.6
286.6
301.1
328.7
352.4
368
393.8
362
316.6

0.14
0.14
0.16
0.16
0.15
0.18
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.2
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.24
0.25
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.3
0.27
0.24

417
488.1
642.5
732
836.5
988.9
1125.9
1215.8
1288.2
1268.4
1410.6
1669.2
2017.1
2188.8
2352.4
2656.3
2925.8
3247.8
3489.6
3084
2852.8

0.47
0.54
0.68
0.75
0.84
0.97
1.07
1.13
1.18
1.17
1.3
1.51
1.77
1.87
1.97
2.17
2.32
2.52
2.65
2.34
2.18

3614066
3993443
4572954
4363620
3880888
3902177
4027646
4579822
5101697
5131446
5230878

2.87%
3.10%
3.47%
3.31%
2.98%
3.00%
3.06%
3.43%
3.75%
3.73%
3.82%

10467
12621
11769
12031
12846
12750
12826
12423
12474
13150
13067
14085
7444
8477
9343
10261
9692
8361
8288
8384
8748
8534
15733

0.0105%
0.0124%
0.0112%
0.0111%
0.0117%
0.0118%
0.0118%
0.0112%
0.0109%
0.0112%
0.0109%
0.0115%
0.0059%
0.0066%
0.0071%
0.0078%
0.0074%
0.0064%
0.0063%
0.0063%
0.0064%
0.0062%
0.0115%

1075730
1154169
1210312
1230355
1405284
1816889
2097630
2397181
2478726
2951235
2549653
2725800
3012681
2676010
2390634
2188383
2325501
2615315
2930520
2901213
2875337

1.021%
1.069%
1.105%
1.135%
1.293%
1.639%
1.835%
2.044%
2.071%
2.404%
2.025%
2.113%
2.286%
2.030%
1.834%
1.683%
1.769%
1.956%
2.153%
2.108%
2.102%

Source: SIC 736, 7361, 7363 data from Current Employment Statistics; NAICS 5613, 56131, 53132,56133 data from County Business Patterns.

56133 Professional
Employers % Agg.
(CBP)

436192
453642
489578
550395
534364
607861
648740
622960
677234
827983
881170
1009768
1253808
1338941
1181080
1562943
1519585
1746555
1929137
1983451
2069045

0.41%
0.42%
0.45%
0.51%
0.49%
0.55%
0.57%
0.53%
0.57%
0.67%
0.70%
0.78%
0.95%
1.02%
0.91%
1.20%
1.16%
1.31%
1.42%
1.44%
1.51%
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Table 3 – Employment Services Industry, Operating Revenues – Canada ($000,000’s)
Year

Total revenues

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

433.0
537.0
713.0
945.0
1154.0
1422.0
1776.0
2105.0
2105.0
1891.0
1752.0
1844.0
2110.0
2479.0

4,047.3
n/a
5144.1
5125.0
5420.7
5689.1
6268.9
7402.0
8217.5
9108.2
9323.1
8583.7

Temporary
Help %

Placement %

Other27 %

81.0
n/a
75.7
79.0
79.3
79.7
79.0
77.2
68.9
59.6
60.2
60.7

18.0
n/a
21.5
18.4
18.6
19.5
19.3
21.7
29.7
36.4
36.8
30.7

‐‐
n/a
2.828
2.6
2.1
0.8
1.8
1.1
1.4
4.1
3.0
8.6

2010
9298.6
56.3
35.6
8.1
Source: Annual Report on the Survey of Services Industry: Employment Services,
Statistics Canada
Note: Wherever applicable, “revised” estimates are used for each year published in subsequent annual reports.
Note: Data for 1982‐1995 are based on the SIC 1980 industry 3‐digit category 771 Employment Agencies and
Personnel Suppliers. Data from 1998 are based on the NAICS.

27

The title “Other” is used by Statistics Canada in these annual Reports, and seemingly reflects a view that this
latter category is more of a catchall category, one that cannot be said to simply represent revenues relating to
employee leasing or professional employer services.
28
Statistics Canada estimates that in 2000, 1.3% of overall industry revenues were from “payroll services” and
1.5% was from “other” services.
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Table 4: Employment Services Industry, Operating Revenues, 1997‐2007 (selected years) ‐
U.S.A. ($000,000s)
Year
1997
2002
2007

Employment
Services
86,133
128,661
209,690

Placement
4,787 (5.6%)
5,940 (4.6%)
18,794 (9.0%)

Temporary Help

Professional
Employer
57,221 (66.4%) 24,125 (28.0%)
68,190 (53%) 54,532 (42.3%)
105,691 (50.4%) 85,205 (40.6%)

Source: Economics Census for applicable years.

At the same time, prior to 2009‐10, the data confirms that the “professional employer” services
category was a very small and insignificant portion of the Canadian employment services
industry. Indeed, it is revealing to note that in its annual publication of these statistics,
Statistics Canada has consistently presented this third sub‐category of revenues – those
resulting from neither placement nor temporary help services – as merely a category of “other”
services, suggesting a lack of confidence in its ability to attribute these revenues to
“professional employer” services at all. Even as an ambiguous catchall category, the proportion
of services represented by this “other” category only grew very recently (during 2007‐10).
In contrast, U.S. data on industry revenues confirms the relatively large size of the U.S.
professional employer industry, both in comparison to what exists in Canada, and in terms of its
share of the U.S. staffing industry. The data shows that extraordinary growth (126%) occurred
in the fairly short period between 1997 and 2002, with very high growth rates (40.6%)
continuing in the next 5 years, even if this was outpaced by then even more extraordinary
growth (216%) in placement related services from 2002 to 2007.
Overall, the data reveal on the one hand a common growth pattern, in an aggregate sense, of
triangular employment as embodied in these two forms of staffing services, while on the other
hand an important divergence. Triangular employment growth has been far greater in the U.S.
in recent decades, where it has been based in two categories of services, rather than just in
temporary help services, as in Canada.
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III. Regulatory Differentials and Employer Status Rules in the U.S. and Canada:
This section explains the growth patterns reviewed in the previous section by providing legal
analysis showing 1) the emergence (and expansion) of key regulatory differentials in the U.S. (in
the two subfields of regulation of employer‐based pensions and employer‐sponsored health
care plans) absent in Canada, during the relevant time period, and 2) the role of employer
status rules in mediating access to these regulatory differentials. Analysis begins with the
latter.
Employer Status Rules in Canada and the U.S.
In both Canada and the U.S., employer status is allocated in accordance with common law rules
involving the application of certain types of “tests”. Applying such tests against the underlying
facts of a purported, contractual arrangement, employer status allocation adheres to what the
ILO refers to as “the primacy of fact.”29 Further, de jure employer status is not necessarily
uniform across policy sub‐fields or regimes, meaning that status may be allocated somewhat
differently by adjudicators in different regimes or contexts. For example, the capture of de jure
employer status for staffing firms under payroll tax rules does not guarantee a similar outcome
for the purposes of minimum employment standards, labor relations, or workers compensation
regimes.30 Nevertheless, certain patterns are identifiable and in both countries, core common
law tests have evolved.
In the U.S., the application of common law tests to triangular relationships may result in there
being an employment relationship declared with one or more “employers” meeting the test for
29

International Labour Conference, Report V(1): Scope of the Employment Relationship, International Labour
Conference, 95th Session, 2006, p. 24.
30
For example, one remaining distinction is that adjudicators under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which primarily
addresses issues of minimum wage, and hours of work restrictions, continue to apply the concept of
“dependency”. See subsequent discussion of employer status case law in Part VI. In terms of tax law, although the
common law employer test has been codified, for certain purposes, such as liability for withholding, reporting and
remitting payroll taxes, the IRS additionally employs quite a different concept referred to as the “statutory
employer” or the “section 3401(d)(1) employer”, based on identifying the party with the “control of the payment
of wages”. See IRC section 3401(d)(1), and see IRS, Internal Revenue Manual Part 5.1.24 “Third‐Party Payer
Arrangements for Employment Taxes”, at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part5/irm_05‐001‐024r.html. Mere status as a
“section 3401(d)(1) employer” for tax purposes would not necessarily translate into common law employer status
in a different institutional context.
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employer status. In this context, the process of applying the test for “employer” status in these
contexts may be understood as a simultaneous test for whether the worker is an “employee” of
the organization in question. The most common test for determining employer status in the
U.S. has been referred to as the “common law agency test”, which relies heavily on indicia of
control and supervision, and thus has sometimes been referred to as the “right to control”
test.31 This approach involves case‐by‐case application of an extensive, although non‐
exhaustive list of factors, including thirteen factors cited by the Court in Community for Creative
Non‐Violence v. Reid.32 In this approach “special weight is given to the control of the manner
and means by which assigned tasks are completed”.33
Historically, certain other “tests” have at times been employed by U.S. courts and adjudicators
in different contexts, emphasizing somewhat different criteria. While some commentators
have argued that there is little substantive difference between the alternatives, conceivably
they do signal some subtle emphasis of certain factors over others. Some of these alternatives
have been referred to as the “statutory purposes” test, the "economic realities” test, the
“hybrid” test, and the “common law entrepreneurial control” test.34 The “statutory purpose”
test is an approach that is broader than the traditional common law agency test.35 Here the
adjudicator expressly looks to factors seemingly beyond the normal indicia of control, to other
factors based upon an interpretation of the goals of the particular statute in question and/or
the mischief it is aimed at redressing.36 The “economic realities” test purportedly looks beyond
indicia of control to examine underlying factors generating “economic dependence” of the

31

See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Robert T. Darden 503 US 318; 112 SCt. 1344 (1992). (“Darden”).
490 U.S. 730, 751‐52 (1989). Darden was a case involving issues of entitlement to employer benefits, while the
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worker upon the entity.37 While there is some uncertainty and debate about the precise scope
of this test and the degree of substantive difference between it and the general common law
agency test, it is fair to say that this approach is considered to be a relatively more expansive
concept of employee status.38 The so‐called “hybrid” test is said to combine the common law
and economic realities test and attempt to steer a middle ground.39 Here, the court gives
significant weight to both indicia of control, and economic dependence.40
Since the development of the alternative tests has to a large extent been driven by the question
of differentiating employees from workers who are not employees of any employer (Ie.
independent contractors) some of the unique aspects of these alternative tests are less
relevant in understanding U.S. employer status rules with respect to triangular employment.41
In any event, the U.S. Supreme Court in Darden effectively narrowed the acceptable approach
to determining employer status in these contexts, by holding that the common law agency test
must be the default approach, unless the underlying statute explicitly specifies an alternative
definition of “employee”.42
Overall then, employer status rules in the U.S. in recent decades have shunned a broader
purposive approach, favoring a more mechanical one focused on indicators of day to day
control over work functions.43 This arguably made it easier, over time, for staffing firms to
construct service arrangements under which the staffing firm became endowed with de jure
37
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employer status, in place of the user firm. Lobel similarly argues that over time, staffing
industry actors have undoubtedly learned to adjust the factual characteristics and contractual
provisions in staffing arrangements, in order to maximize the likelihood of the staffing firm
being the de jure employer.44 Lenz also concurs, noting that through the use of onsite
managers or “managed services”, it is usually possible to construct the necessary degree of
control in the hands of the staffing firm required for it to hold de jure employer status.45
Canadian tests for de jure employer status also involve a review of numerous relevant factors
on a case‐by‐case basis. In Canada, however, the distinction between the analysis used to
determine “employer” status within triangular employment contexts and the general tests for
whether “employment” exists (Ie. whether the worker is an employee of someone) is
somewhat greater than in the U.S. Since there is no Canadian common law recognition of a
concept analogous to the U.S. “joint employer” concept (see discussion infra) in the backdrop,
the analytical approach has generally rather been one of more explicitly striving to determine
the so‐called “true” employer in the triangular relationship. One classic and commonly
articulated test for determining the “true” employer, set out in York Condominium46, involves
identifying and considering each of the following:
‐

the party exercising direction and control over the employees;

‐

the party bearing the burden of remuneration;

‐

the party imposing discipline;

‐

the party hiring the employees;

‐

the party with authority to dismiss the employees;

‐

the party who is perceived to be the employer by the

employees; and
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‐

the existence of an intention to create the relationship of

employer and employee.
Although the concept of “control” has been an important factor in Canadian tests for
employer status, additional factors supporting a relatively broader analysis are regularly
invoked. In 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada in Pointe‐Claire47 identified similar criteria as
those in the York Condominium case in its decision concerning the Quebec Labour Code
which has slightly different criteria for establishing the identity of the employer. However,
the Supreme Court further stated that a broad or comprehensive analysis is often required,
looking beyond indicators of control or supervision (referred to as the “legal subordination”
criterion). The Court stated:

“According to this more comprehensive approach, the legal subordination
and integration into the business criteria should not be used as exclusive
criteria for identifying the real employer. In my view, in a context of
collective relations governed by the Labour Code, it is essential that
temporary employees be able to bargain with the party that exercises the
greatest control over all aspects of their work‐‐and not only over the
supervision of their day‐to‐day work. Moreover, when there is a certain
splitting of the employer's identity in the context of a tripartite relationship,
the more comprehensive and more flexible approach has the advantage of
allowing for a consideration of which party has the most control over all
aspects of the work on the specific facts of each case. Without drawing up
an exhaustive list of factors pertaining to the employer‐employee
relationship, I shall mention the following examples: the selection process,
hiring, training, discipline, evaluation, supervision, assignment of duties,
remuneration and integration into the business.48 [emphasis added]
The Supreme Court of Canada also noted that within the extensive jurisprudence on the
question of the true employer, over time certain factors have become more important than
others.49 The most important goal is to try to gauge which entity has the greatest overall
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control over the employment relationship in its entirety.50 Overall, while there is much
consensus in Canada that “control” remains a very important factor, it is fairly clear that no one
set of factors is determinative, and that the approach must be a broad and “purposive” one,
designed to ascertain the true overall “substance” of the relationship, implying potentially less
focus on surface “form”.51
Compared to U.S. trends, Canadian adjudicators seem to have embraced the broader,
expansive and more “purposive” examination of the “essence” of the relationship, reminiscent
of the “economic realities” approach in the U.S. that was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1990 in Darden. This suggests that there are comparably fewer degrees of freedom in the
hands of US adjudicators to reject the transfer of employer status from user to client, based on
the transfer of day‐to‐day control functions consciously assigned to suppliers under many
staffing arrangements. Employer status, or at least a credible claim of employer status under
prevailing rules, has been comparably more easily constructed in staffing arrangements in the
U.S. than in Canada. Therefore, to the extent that there are regulatory differentials in either
country available to user firms, favoring the use of staffing services based on triangular
employment, access to such gains has been comparably greater in the U.S..
This general conclusion may need to be qualified slightly by an examination of the additional
rules governing recognition of multiple employer status in certain contexts, so a brief discussion
of these is also required. The two most common concepts applied in the U.S. to construct a
multiple employer nexus are the “joint employer” and the “single employer” concepts, the
application of which typically necessitates rather complex, “fact intensive”52 litigation, on an ad
hoc basis. Although their application in practice has been somewhat inconsistent, and at times
seemingly overlapping, they are based on formally separate definitions.53 A single employer
refers to situations where “two nominally separate entities are actually part of a single
50
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integrated enterprise,”54 and is commonly applied in the parent‐subsidiary context. The
doctrine is designed to address the “fairness of imposing liability for labor infractions where
two nominally independent entities do not act under an arm’s length relationship”.55 One
approach, developed in the labor relations context, is a four‐factor test that emphasizes: 1)
whether operations are interrelated, 2) whether common management exists, 3) whether the
parties have common ownership or financial control, and 4) whether centralized control of
labor relations exists.56 By contrast, the “joint employer” concept de‐emphasizes the question
of whether the nominally separate organizations are economically integrated, involving
common ownership and/or management. Rather, this test focuses more simply on whether
both parties “share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions
of employment….To establish joint employer status there must be a showing that the employer
meaningfully affects matters relating to the employment relationship such as hiring, firing,
discipline, supervision, and direction.”57
In Canada, the recognition of multiple employers is driven more by statutory provisions
specifying, even in very general terms, the factors and contexts that give rise to their
recognition, and there is little evidence of such concepts having emerged strictly from the
common law.58 Further, statutory support for the multiple employer concept varies across
provinces, and policy subfields, and statutory support outside of the labor relations regime is
very limited.59 Further, as Fudge and Zavitz have noted, in Canada, adjudicative recognition of
multiple employers has mostly been dependent upon existence of common organization
ownership and control.60 Thus, the Canadian approach resembles that under the narrower
“single employer” concept in the U.S.. This suggests that to some extent, U.S. law provides
54
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adjudicators comparably more degrees of freedom to declare user and staffing firms to be
multiple employers.
Overall, this means a slight caveat may be imposed on the conclusion stated above ‐ that U.S.
employer status rules overall have provided user firms in the U.S. with comparably greater
access to existing regulatory differentials under triangular employment.

The caveat is that

this assumes that the effect of their being a difference in tests for determining “the” employer
is not outweighed by the effect of rules addressing the possibility of multiple “employers.” This
is arguably a reasonable assumption, since it is fair to say that in both countries, there has
remained a deeply engrained policy paradigm favoring the conception of an employer as a
unitary, discrete entity.61
Regulatory Differentials in Canada and the U.S.
This section outlines the existence of certain key regulatory differentials driving triangular
employment growth. While it is possible that regulatory differentials providing a range of
advantages from triangular employment (to the user firm) may exist under various policy sub‐
fields, a complete analysis pertaining to all legal subfields of labor and employment law in
Canada and the U.S. is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, analysis here is limited to two
key sub‐fields: regulation of retirement plans, and the regulation of employer provided health
care benefits. Analysis will show that in the U.S., these two subfields contain stark regulatory
differentials, absent in Canada, capable of producing concrete, measurable monetary gains
from triangular employment for user firms.
The Regulation of Retirement Plans
Neither Canadian nor U.S. law requires employers to provide their workers with
retirement/pension benefits. However, aspects of regulation may affect employers’ incentives
when deciding whether to provide benefits, the quantity provided, and the distribution of
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benefits. As well, both countries have, for more than a half‐century, provided workers with
access to public pension programs providing limited retirement‐age benefits.62
In 1974, the U.S. federal government adopted a protective regime establishing various
minimum standards in administration, disclosure and content controls in the Employee
Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA),63 which regulated (albeit to quite different
degrees) both “pension”64 and “welfare” benefits plans of various sorts. In addition to the
“labor law” standards set out in the ERISA regime since 1974, the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”)
also contains various other crucially important components of pension regulation in the U.S., in
the form of substantial tax subsidies for “qualified” pensions, along with the myriad of rules
determining plan qualification. 65 Some of ERISA’s rules on vesting, service, benefit accrual
requirements, and pension content controls were duplicated in the Internal Revenue Code,
imposing them as additional requirements for pension qualification, and hence preferential tax
treatment.66 The aggregate size of this tax subsidy for qualified private pension plans in the
U.S. is huge, in the range of $100 billion annually,67 and thus it is generally recognized that the
tax rules have “an enormous influence that largely determines the structure and scope of any
employer plan (considered singly) and of the entire employment‐based pension and health
insurance systems of the United States”.68
There are three aspects of the preferential treatment flowing from plan qualification under the
IRC: the employer may claim the cost of the plan benefit as a tax deduction;69 earnings on the
62
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pension trust funds are exempt from taxes until distributed70; and covered employees do not
have to pay income tax on the employer’s contribution to the plan.71 The IRC “exclusive benefit
rule” requires that funds must be held in trust for exclusive benefit of “employees”72 and their
beneficiaries, and thus the common law test for “employee” is an important concept in this
area.
Given the significant size of the tax subsidy provided to private pension plans, the Internal
Revenue Code has also for a long time contained provisions designed to encourage a more
egalitarian distribution of retirement benefits than what would otherwise occur. In this vein,
U.S. tax law has linked qualification of retirement plans to satisfaction of certain egalitarian
principles of “non‐discrimination” in coverage and benefits.73 The Revenue Acts of 1938 and
1942 imposed certain basic requirements that qualified plans could not discriminate in favor of
“highly compensated employees” (HCEs). In 1942, Congress began to close the “loophole that
permitted discriminatory plans” by adopting legislation that “disqualified pension plans that
discriminated in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly compensated
employees.”74 In 1974, Title II of ERISA amended the IRC in various ways, including the
adoption of rules aimed at preventing the skirting of existing non‐discrimination provisions
through creative (re)arrangements in corporate structure.75
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The various IRC pension plan qualification and non‐discrimination rules may be conceived of as
an important set of contingent regulatory differentials in the U.S. They allow for differences in
regulatory effect – different plan qualification outcomes and resulting (and potentially very
large) monetary consequences ‐ under direct and triangular employment in various contexts.
Staffing services emerged as a tool in accessing these gains. Initially, the IRS applied the
traditional common law tests for employer status to scrutinize the “legitimacy” of the growing
number of staffing arrangements.76 This approach seemingly left space for the construction of
staffing arrangements resulting in the transfer of employer status to the staffing firm, in a
significant range of contexts. As Cohen notes:
“In these rulings, the IRS typically found a common‐law employer‐employee relationship
to exist between a leasing organization and its leased employees where the organization
operated in a manner which was similar to the organization described in [Revenue
Ruling 75‐41] (e.g., the leasing organization had the right to control and discharge the
employees and was in charge of recruiting, hiring and evaluating employees. Notably,
many of the rulings found an employer‐employee relationship between the leasing
organization and the leased employees notwithstanding the organization’s practice of
hiring former employees of the subscriber.”77
Subsequently, Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (“TEFRA”),
in order to clarify – and tighten ‐ the application of IRC plan qualification rules in staffing
service contexts. TEFRA added section 414(n)(2) to the IRC, which defined the concept of a
“leased employee.” TEFRA required that all “leased employees” were to be treated as
employees of the “recipient” (user) firm, unless the leasing organization satisfied a safe harbor
test by providing a minimum level of pension benefits to the leased employees. Under TEFRA,
a “leased employee” was defined as:
“…any person who provides services to the recipient if
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(A) such services are provided pursuant to an agreement between the recipient and
any other person (in this subsection referred to as the “leasing organization”),
(B) such person has performed such services for the recipient (or for the recipient
and related persons) on a substantially full‐time basis for a period of at least 1
year,78 and
(C) such services are of a type historically performed, in the business field of the
recipient, by employees.”79
This language in TEFRA contained multiple ambiguities. One significant issue was the
relationship between the traditional common law concept of an employer‐employee
relationship and this new concept of a “leased employee”. Did one concept preclude, or
alternatively presuppose, the existence of the other?80 To supposedly aid in the interpretation
of this subsection, in 1984 Congress passed a slight revision to 414(n)(2), changing a portion of
the language in the s. 414(n)(2) from “any person who provides services to the recipient” to
“any person who is not an employee of the recipient and who provides services to the
recipient”.81 Although arguably still ambiguous since the word “employee” continued to be
undefined, this revised language seemingly suggested that workers would thereafter be
treated as “employees” of the recipient/user under the IRC plan qualification provisions to
which 414(n)(2) applied, in two separate ways. First, they would be treated as employees
wherever traditional common law tests suggested they were employees. Secondly, even
where they were not found to be employees of the recipient/user under the common law,
they were to be deemed employees of the user/recipient where the requirements of 414(n)(2)
78
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were satisfied. Although some ambiguity continued to linger over this relationship between
the common law tests and s 414(n)(2), this interpretative approach was eventually confirmed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) in its 1998 decision in Burrey v. Pacific Electric & Gas.82
Beyond the question of the relationship between s. 414(n)(2) and the common law definition
of employee, additional ambiguity embedded in this provision remained salient for some time,
particularly with respect to subsection (c).83 That is, it was quite unclear how the requirement
that the “services are of a type historically performed, in the business field of the recipient, by
employees” was to be applied. First, there was no clear understanding of the threshold level
of regularity that was meant by work being “historically performed” by employees. Arlin notes
that proposed Treasury regulations in the early 1980’s
“consider services to be historically performed by employees in a recipient’s service
organization or business field if it was ‘not unusual’ for employees to perform the
services. This language implied that if services are performed perhaps thirty percent of
the time by unleased employees, it is ‘not unusual’ for employees to perform those
services. The IRS may, therefore, treat a leased employee as an employee under section
414(n), even though he provides services that are predominantly provided by leased
employees in the relevant business field.”84
Further, the scope of activities that should be deemed to constitute the “business field” within
which comparison must take place was uncertain, and this could significantly affect the
application of the provision. These significant ambiguities in the interpretation of IRC
414(n)(2) remained intact until an important revision to this section occurred in 1996,
discussed infra. Importantly, each of these ambiguities in the definition, which remained
intact throughout much of the 1980’s, may be understood as having produced a relatively
more expansive conception of a “leased employee,” as of 1982. This expanded the potential
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scope of enforcement of s 414(n)(2), and thus effectively narrowed the available space for
using staffing services to access the regulatory differentials in the IRC plan qualification and
non‐discrimination rules.
The three subsections in IRC 414(n)(2) are conjunctive, meaning that they all must be satisfied
prior to supplied workers being deemed “leased employees” and counted as the user’s
employees under the pension qualification tests. The requirement in subsection (B) that the
definition of a “leased employee” would not be applied to workers unless they have supplied
services to the recipient on a “substantially full‐time basis for a period of at least 1 year” has
from the outset narrowed the scope of the provision, expanding the possibility of using
staffing services to access IRC‐based regulatory differentials, where it is feasible to utilize
supplied workers on either a temporary (less than 12 months) or part‐time (or less than
“substantially full‐time”) basis. This subsection mirrors the more general qualifying rule
allowing for exclusion of workers from plan participation, where they work on either a
temporary (less than 12 months) or part‐time basis (the “1000 hour rule").85
In 1986, Congress revised the underlying IRC plan qualification rules themselves, adopting
stricter coverage tests for retirement plans beginning in 1988.86 Lenz summarized the new
non‐discrimination rules as follows:
“A plan must cover (1) a percentage of rank‐and‐file employees equal to at least 70% of
the percentage of higher paid employees benefited, or (2) a nondiscriminatory
classification of employees based on objective standards and provide lower‐paid
employees an average benefit that is at least 70% of the average benefit provided to
higher‐paid employees… employers can no longer provide qualified retirement benefits
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simply by covering a nondiscriminatory classification of employees (e.g. full‐time salaried
employees).”87
This prohibition of discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees applies with
regard to coverage, amount of benefits, and availability of benefits, and applies to both
“defined benefit” and “defined contribution” plans.88 A highly compensated employee is
defined as any employee who owns 5% or more of the firm, or whose compensation in 2009
exceeded $110,000 (indexed to inflation).89
In addition to these changes, the 1986 Tax Reform Act also contained radical reductions in
income tax rates, particularly on higher income earners, with the top bracket marginal tax rate
falling from 50 to 28 percent. Together, these two reforms embodied a contradictory tension.
The new non‐discrimination requirements tightened and increased the redistributional
dimension of plan qualification rules. So, on the one hand, the new rules imposed a relatively
more egalitarian standard of redistribution, via pension coverage and distribution, from higher
to lower income earners. On the other, however, the reduction in the underlying marginal tax
rate effectively reduced the size of the “subsidy” provided to high income earners, in the form
of tax savings that comes from being a participant in a qualified (read: egalitarian) pension
plan. The higher the underlying marginal tax rate on income, then the higher the value of the
tax subsidy under plan qualification. Effectively, the higher the underlying marginal tax rates
on high income earners operating in the background within this system, the greater the space
for a net gain to high income earners from participating in qualified plans, even after the
redistributive effect of the plan qualification and non‐discrimination rules. Thus, while the
1986 tax reforms imposed relatively more egalitarian qualification rules, the simultaneous,
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dramatic cut in marginal tax rates on higher income earners reduced the overall amount of
value available for redistribution under plan participation, leaving much less residual value to
induce/coerce continued participation in egalitarian plans.90
The overall combined result is that post‐1986, there was likely a substantial decline in
willingness of employers, and high earning employees, to participate in egalitarian qualified
pension plans, increasing pressure on employers to reduce (or discontinue) pension benefits
provision altogether, and/or to develop strategies for avoiding the redistributional effects of
the plan qualification rules. In other words, these developments expanded the size of
regulatory differentials potentially provided by triangular employment. Increasingly, with
further legal developments working in tandem, staffing services became an instrument to
access these gains. The pressure to access these regulatory differentials became increasingly
salient post‐1986, and other developments increasingly liberalized user firm access to them.
The first of these subsequent developments occurred in 1992 when, as discussed earlier in this
paper, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Darden. To the extent that this decision
narrowed the space for broader interpretive approaches to determining employer status, it
further expanded the space for constructing staffing arrangements enabling the transfer of de
jure employer status to staffing firms. As noted already, as a result of this Supreme Court
ruling, a similar interpretive shift could reasonably be assumed to have occurred subsequently
in the application of the common law test within the taxation field.
An additional significant development occurred in 1996, when Congress enacted the Small
Business Job Protection Act, which further revised the definition of “leased employee” in IRC
414(n)(2) as of Jan 1, 1997, by removing the requirement in subsection (C) that services
performed by workers be of the type historically performed by employees in the recipient’s
field of business. This removed two arguably ambiguous aspects of the prior test that had the
practical tendency of expanding the scope of application of the “leased employee” concept.
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In the new subsection (c), this element of the test was replaced with the requirement that
“such services are performed under primary direction or control by the recipient” (emphasis
added). This narrowed the definition of a “leased employee”, thus narrowing the
circumstances in which supplied workers would have to be included in user firm plan
qualification tests. As Lenz confirms: “This test [the previous subsection (C)] was widely
criticized as being too broad in its application. The control test significantly narrows the scope
of the leased employee rules”.91 Logically, the “leased employees” test only applies to those
workers who were not already deemed employees of the user under the common law, and
this interpretive logic was confirmed in the case of Burrey v. Pacific Electric & Gas. But as we
have already seen, the U.S. common law employer status tests already placed primary
emphasis on indicators of control. Therefore, it is hard to even conceive of the particular kinds
of factual circumstances in which workers deemed staffing firm employees (and not
recipient/user firm employees) under common law tests that are based primarily upon
indicators of control, would then subsequently nevertheless be deemed to be “leased
employees”, given that the latter test now required that “primary direction or control” reside
with the user/recipient.92 It would seem then that the 1996 statutory revision was akin to
repealing the requirements in subsection (c) that had previously enabled the leased employee
concept in s. 414(n)(2) to function as a broader test, to capture staffing arrangements beyond
those caught by existing common law. Again, this is in addition to the fact that, as discussed
above, the common law itself had already evolved in a manner liberalizing the ability to use of
staffing arrangements to access regulatory differentials in retirement plan regulation in the
IRC.
Although staffing firms have sometimes faced a relatively heavier burden of proof on the
question of “control” with respect to certain classes of workers (e.g. office and clerical service
workers),93 in general the new definition of a “leased employee” in s. 414(n)(2) clearly favored
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staffing arrangements in which day‐to‐day direction and control was in the hands of the
staffing firm. Further, Lenz also points out that even clients using “professional” workers
supplied by a staffing firm, are also likely able to avoid the scope of application of 414(n)(2).
Here, Lenz notes that various kinds of professional workers (e.g. computer programmers,
system analysts, engineers, doctors, lawyers, accountants, actuaries, etc.) will generally not be
considered “leased employees”:
“if they regularly use their own judgment and discretion on matters of importance in the
performance of their services and are guided by professional, legal, or industry standards.
They do not have to be counted by the client, even though the staffing firm does not
closely supervise them on a continuing basis and even though the client requires their
services to be performed on site and in accordance with client‐determined timetables and
techniques.”94
While it may be that professionals are more often likely to be “highly compensated
employees,” staffing arrangements involving professionals are no less relevant as a potential
tool in avoiding coverage requirements, since the exclusion of highly compensated employees
(and thus their pensions) from the calculations may in various contexts improve user firms’
ability to meet the non‐discrimination rules, preserving the tax subsidy for the employer and
high income earners, while avoiding the provision of more egalitarian pension benefits.
Further, the “safe harbor” rules, which allow for exclusion of “leased employees” where a
pension meeting certain alternative tests is provided by the staffing firm,95 do not significantly
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alter the analysis or conclusions of this section, given that the nature of the rules has almost
completely eliminated the existence of qualified “safe harbor” plans in the U.S.96
The overall trajectory described here can be summarized as follows. Various retirement plan
qualification and non‐discrimination rules in U.S. pensions law have for decades formed an
important set of regulatory differentials likely stimulating triangular employment in the U.S..
Under 1986 reforms, the gains from accessing these differentials expanded. Yet further
developments in both common law employer status rules, and revisions to the particular
“leased employee” rules, liberalized user firm access to these differentials through staffing
services.
By contrast, Canadian law regulating employer‐based pension plans does not contain any set
of rules that may be conceived of as being analogous regulatory differentials like those in U.S.
tax law97 that might theoretically stimulate triangular employment growth. Pension standards
rules in provincial legislation do not generally mandate the provision of any sort of employer
minimum plan coverage, nor impose analogous qualification rules concerning distribution
amongst different groups of employees. The only weak analogue in Canadian pension
regulation might be certain rules specifying that within classes of employees, which classes
employers are essentially free to structure in their plans as they see fit, employees must be
treated “equally” in certain regards. However, since there are essentially no rules requiring
equitable treatment as between different classes, and there is also freedom in the creation of
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alternative plans for different classes, these constraints would seem to barely, if at all, restrict
employer freedom in allocation of pension benefits, and thus would not amount to regulatory
differentials as conceived herein.98 As well, Canadian pension law generally does not utilize
analogous sorts of “headcount” rules, where regulatory effect is conditioned by certain counts
of employees, nor measurements of treatment between different employee groups.
Overall then, comparative analysis of regulation in this subfield reveals that for several
decades there has existed significant regulatory differentials stimulating triangular
employment in the U.S. that are absent in Canada, and that beginning in 1986, law reform
seems to have on the one hand exacerbated the magnitude of these regulatory differentials,
while on the other liberalizing user firm access to them via staffing services. This is highly
consistent with the observed patterns of triangular employment growth reviewed above.
The Regulation of Employer Sponsored Healthcare Benefits
U.S. law also does not require employers to provide employees with health benefits. However,
employment relations in the U.S. are influenced by the absence of universal health care, with
the allocation of healthcare resources being relatively more determined by market mechanisms
and private insurance schemes than in many other countries, including Canada. The U.S.
system relies substantially upon private employer provision of health insurance coverage, along
with forms of employment‐based regulation, to achieve healthcare policy goals.99 However,
even the U.S. system ought to be understood as being at most semi‐private in nature, given the
preferential tax treatment (Ie. subsidy) that it involves. Recent estimates of the U.S. tax
expenditure associated with exclusion of employer contributions towards medical insurance
98
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premiums and medical care range from $137‐155 billion in 2010,100 making health care benefits
the most costly of all types of employer welfare benefits.101
While the tax preference given to retirement benefits is tax deferral, employer healthcare
expenses are granted an outright tax exemption in the current year.102 Further, tax treatment
of employer‐sponsored health benefits is comparably favorable to other health care financing
arrangements like individual self‐insurance,103 reinforcing the historical practice in the U.S. of
using employment as a key platform for health care governance.104
This rather deep policy preference in the U.S. for employer provision of health care insurance
coincides with a number of related dynamics in the U.S. market for “fully insured” health plans
(Ie. plans purchased by employers from insurers) that are important for understanding the
nature of the regulatory differentials in this field. The market for employer health insurance
plans has historically been quite influenced by the fact that there is great variation in employer
sizes as well as quasi‐fixed costs for insurers in the sale, service and administration of each
separate employer health plan. Thus, significant economies of scale exist, enabling larger firms
to reduce their costs, while smaller firms pay substantially more, per worker.105 In addition, the
U.S. government also became increasingly concerned that small employers were being
disproportionately discriminated against, or otherwise mistreated by insurers. As a result,
insurance law in the U.S. has for several decades bifurcated the market for employer health
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insurance into two notional product markets, namely “small group” and “large group” markets,
and has imposed a relatively greater regulatory burden on insurers in the small group
market.106 This regulatory approach was intensified in 1996 with the passage of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)107, intensifying regulatory requirements,
disproportionately directed towards small group plans.108 In this context, it is not surprising
that larger employers in the U.S. have a much higher healthcare benefits coverage rate.109
Given this background regulatory context in the U.S., there are significant latent economies of
scale that are at least potentially110 available for realization through coordinated systems of
insurance purchasing/provision across multiple smaller firms. Staffing firms, particularly those
more commonly identified as PEOs, have been emerging as an increasingly popular tool for this
task. Using the economies of scale from having multiple clients, PEOs may be able to purchase
health insurance plans covering each client’s “worksite employees”, and provide clients’ with
greater insurance purchasing power.111 Indeed, this healthcare insurance pooling function
forms one of the key stated grounds for why the PEO industry embraces the concept of “co‐
employment”, and struggles to preserve the PEO’s status as “an” (if not at times “the”) de jure
employer of its clients’ workforces.112 To see why this is so, further understanding of
background regulation in this area is helpful.
Employer provided health insurance plans are a form of “welfare plan” regulated under ERISA,
a federal enactment, which largely pre‐empts state regulation of employer sponsored health
106

While there are some variations, the most commonly used definition of a “small group” policy is one that covers
from 2‐50 employees, while a “large group” policy covers greater than 50 employees. Key informant interview,
National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
107
Pub.L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936, enacted August 21, 1996.
108
Under HIPAA, small group plans face certain additional “mandates” or mandatory benefits; limits on pre‐
existing condition exclusions; and rules concerning guaranteed issue and renewal.
109
MARK MERLIS, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND EMPLOYER‐SPONSORED INSURANCE FOR WORKING
AMERICANS (2012).
110
That is, to the extent legally allowed.
111
Consistent with this, NAPEO claims that the average workforce size of PEO clients in the U.S. is approximately
19 employees. See NAPEO, 2009 Financial Ratio and Operating Statistics Survey. Note however that there is some
concern about the reliability of measures of size of client firms measured by employee counts. For example, it is
not clear in such surveys whether client self‐reported headcounts include or exclude the very employees supplied
by (or “co‐employed” by) the staffing firm. See also Lombardi and Ono, supra note 13.
112
See Diane Stanton, Rufus Wolff, and William J. Schilling, Employer Status and the PEO Relationship, 6 NAPEO
LEGAL REVIEW 1 (2008).

59

insurance. However, state‐level insurance regulation also applies, addressing insurance
contracts and the relationship between the insurer and insured. The dividing line between
state and federal authority in this area is fairly complex. So called “self‐funded” schemes are
excluded from the federal preemption, while “fully‐insured” arrangements more clearly fall
under state regulation.113 Further, since 1983, ERISA also exempted from preemption plans
defined as “multiple employer welfare arrangements” (“MEWAs”), reinforcing state‐level
authority to regulate these particular insurance arrangements.114 With certain exceptions,
ERISA defines a MEWA rather broadly to be an
“employee welfare benefit plan or any other arrangement … established or maintained
for the purpose of offering or providing any benefit described in paragraph 1 [welfare
benefit plans] to the employees of two or more employers, including one or more self‐
employed individuals, or to their beneficiaries…”.115
Although a plain reading of these provisions would seem to suggest that a PEO‐constructed
health plan arrangement, in which the PEO purports to sponsor a health insurance plan for the
employees of its multiple clients, would constitute a MEWA, the PEO industry has long
struggled to resist this classification. Instead, the industry has sought to have PEO health plans
recognized as being “single employer” plans, regulated by ERISA and not falling under the scope
of state MEWA regulation. In terms of the theoretical framework used here, the different
regulatory systems for single and multiple employer plans create regulatory differentials
favoring triangular employment, particularly for small/medium sized firms.
A major challenge to the industry is that the federal Department of Labor has consistently
applied the traditional common law employer status rules in this context, and has thereby
typically concluded that PEO plans fall within the definition of MEWAs set out in ERISA.116
Varying somewhat with the specific context, being designated a MEWA would almost always
113
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result in a PEO‐sponsored health plan arrangement facing a greater regulatory burden,
oversight, and typically cost, resulting from state MEWA regimes.117 This generates significant
pressure on PEOs to try to function at the margin of MEWA regulation, and to try to structure
arrangements, in the shadow of the normal common law employer concept, so as to defend
the position that they are (at least) “an” employer of the worksite employees, and that insofar
as all client workforces share one employer (the PEO), their plans ought to be deemed single
employer plans. Towards this goal, NAPEO has pro‐actively fashioned some additional
insurance oversight rules into its “model PEO statute” for which it lobbies at the state level,
along with model statutory provisions clarifying that fully‐insured PEO plans are to be treated
as single‐employer plans under state insurance law. Many states have adopted these
regulatory compromises promoted by NAPEO.118
Various other aspects of regulation in this field also constitute regulatory differentials. Basic
rules governing fiduciary standards, reporting and disclosure requirements, and procedures for
appealing denied benefit claims have been in effect in the health policy field, as part of ERISA,
since its adoption in 1974. Similar to the approach taken with retirement plans, tax rules
relating to health benefit plans largely mirror ERISA’s “labor law” standards on health plan
content controls and process requirements. Although over‐arching “non‐discrimination rules”
like those pertaining to retirement plans have not, at least until very recently under PPACA, not
been imposed,119 there have been three exceptions to this fact. First, s. 105(h) of the IRC
prohibits discrimination in favor of highly compensated individuals under employer “self‐
insured” plans (in which the employer, rather than an insurer, assumes the risk of benefits
costs). Second, where health benefits are offered as an option under the “cafeteria plan” rules,
those rules also prohibit discrimination. Third, a final set of rules prohibit contributions to
“health savings accounts” in favor of highly compensated employees, without comparable
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contributions to rank and file employees.120 Each of these sets of rules is contingent regulatory
differentials.

Subsequent legislation created additional regulatory differentials. The Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) added a new Part 6 to ERISA, which included various
new rules requiring employers providing health coverage to temporarily continue plan coverage
for plan participants and beneficiaries in various “qualified events”, which would otherwise
result in coverage loss.121 These qualified events included the death of the covered employee,
a reduction in the employee’s working hours, and termination (except in the case of employee
gross misconduct). Generally, continued coverage must be the same as that provided to
similarly situated employees that have not experienced a “qualified event.”122 Notably, COBRA
applied these new coverage continuation requirements only to plans maintained by an
employer with 20 or more employees.123 Thus, COBRA’s “headcount” rule and the benefits of
avoiding the higher premiums associated with plans caught by COBRA’s extended coverage
requirements are contingent regulatory differentials.

In 1996, two other legislative revisions further increased the regulatory burden on employer
sponsored health care plans. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, amended
Title 1 of ERISA by limiting the circumstances under which a health plan may exclude a
participant with a preexisting condition from coverage,124 prohibiting group health plans from
basing coverage eligibility rules on certain health‐related factors, such as medical history or
disability, and prohibiting higher premiums based on such health related factors.125 The Mental
Health Parity Act (“MHPA”), also adopted in 1996, imposes new rules requiring that plans
120
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offering mental health benefits must not impose lower annual and lifetime limits placed on
medical and surgical benefits. Plans covering employees with 50 or fewer employees are
exempt from the requirements of the MHPA, creating yet another additional, albeit minor,
contingent regulatory differential.
The recent overhaul of healthcare regulation adopted in The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (the “ACA”)126 contains three additional new rule categories embodying regulatory
differentials, or reinforcing the effect of those already discussed. First, the ACA adds a new
section 45R to the IRC127 providing a tax credit for employee health insurance expenses of
“eligible small employers”, defined as employers with fewer than 25 full‐time equivalent
employees (“FTEs”), who earn average annual wages of less than $50,000 per FTE, for whom
the employer maintains a “qualifying arrangement”.128 The latter is a plan for which the
employer pays a uniform percentage of the premium cost for each employee enrolled.129
Secondly, the ACA’s “Shared Responsibility” rules impose penalties on large employers, defined
as those with 50 or more FTEs, who don’t make appropriate health insurance coverage
available to their employees. Such large employers who fail to provide any insurance face a
fine of $2000 per full‐time employee in excess of thirty employees.130 Alternatively, employers
who provide coverage that is inadequate or unaffordable as established by the ACA,131 are
subject to a the lesser of the above fine or $3000 per eligible employee that instead purchases
federally subsidized health insurance on a state health insurance exchange.132
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Thirdly, ACA extends the scope of plans covered by “non‐discrimination” testing rules. While
previously the only plans affected by non‐discrimination rules were self‐insured plans (under
I.R.C. s. 105(h)) and cafeteria plans, PPACA prohibits discrimination in provision of health
benefits in favor of highly compensated employees, by applying rules similar to those in I.R.C. s.
105(h)133 to (non‐grandfathered) fully‐insured group health plans as well. These new provisions
in PPACA create and/or reinforce various incentives for user firms to seek to adjust their
employee headcount and/or employer status in various contexts.
This historical background structure of U.S. regulation of employer‐sponsored health insurance
can thus be seen as having embodied a plethora of regulatory differentials favoring triangular
employment in various contexts. Indeed, similar to the modus operandi of regulatory
differentials in the area of retirement plan regulation, the gains under triangular employment
are concrete, measurable, monetary gains. The historical trajectory of regulation suggests that
over the time period reviewed, the scope of regulatory differentials in the U.S. in this field has
expanded.
Canadian health policy is substantially different in nature, given the existence of universal
public health care provision in every province. In this context, although some employers
provide extended health related benefits of various sorts that provide coverage beyond what is
provided by the public system,134 employer provided health care plays comparably minor role in
the health care system overall.
Indeed, given state provision of health care as backdrop, regulation of employer sponsored
health care benefits is quite minimal in Canada. The only comparable laws in Canada that may
be conceived as embodying any regulatory differential favoring triangular employment are
certain rules within payroll tax systems established towards financing the general healthcare
system. In some cases, tax rates are levied in a progressive manner, with higher rates being
levied on larger employers, defined by payroll size. However, using the Ontario rules as an
example for analysis, there is very little reason to believe these rules would have a significant
133
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effect on triangular employment growth. The Ontario Employer Health Tax Act imposes a levy
on the aggregate payroll of employers, with differential treatment being applied only to the
first $400 thousand in payroll. Thus, differential treatment only occurs at very small payroll
levels, affecting only very small employers. “Eligible employers” under the Act may be entitled
to an exemption on this first $400 thousand, while others face a progressive scale of tax rates
ranging from .98% on the first $200 thousand to 1.95% on payroll above $400 thousand. Here,
there would seemingly be very few circumstances in which user firms would ever save
substantially on employer status transfer, and furthermore the pooling of workers into being
employees of a staffing firm (assuming this could be constructed given the broader employer
status rules in Canada) would in most cases result in the staffing firm having a payroll above the
$400 thousand threshold, which cost would presumably be passed on to the user in any
event.135
Since health care costs are prohibitive, economies of scale in their delivery and/or financing are
important concerns in any jurisdiction. In Canada, state provision generates these economies.
In the U.S. however, the existing model of health insurance provision by tax‐subsidized
employers highlights the problem of “small” employers. Triangular employment relations,
particularly through PEO services, may be conceived of as a mechanism for addressing the
problem of scale, emerging within the confines of background regulation. In the language of
the “varieties of capitalism” literature, triangular employment here constitutes an institutional
arrangement that complements the broader pattern of coordination in this “liberal market
economy,” and may deliver a ceteris peribus “stretching” of health insurance coverage in the
U.S..136 From a more critical lens though, this same triangular employment growth may on the
other hand increasingly empower firms to avoid existing egalitarian rules. This may be done
not only through formal liability avoidance from shifting de jure employer status, but also
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because of the symbolic importance that the concept of “employer” plays in a jurisdiction so
heavily dependent upon employment as a social policy platform.137
IV. Concluding Thoughts
This paper has outlined how significant regulatory differentials in two key subfields of
regulation in the U.S., largely absent in Canada, combined with comparably more liberal access
to these regulatory differentials under U.S. employer status rules, help explain diverging
triangular employment growth patterns in in these countries.
Broader reflection on U.S. developments in particular suggest that regulatory differentials and
resulting triangular employment growth have contributed to a regressive shift in U.S.
employment relations138 and social policy. Prior research suggests the importance of the
salience of fiscal instruments (both tax and spending related) in determining public consent for
the instrument, and also suggests that tax‐expenditure‐based spending measures often have
comparably lower salience than other more direct forms of spending.139 The relaxation of the
“leased employee” rules with the resulting eroded effect of the non‐discrimination rules in
retirement plan regulation over the past few decades, eroded the potentiality of the non‐
discrimination rules as an egalitarian, redistributive policy instrument. However, the fact that
this shift took place within the income tax system likely reduced its salience significantly.
Similarly, triangular employment growth (under PEO services) may be interpreted as a response
to coverage pressures in the U.S. employer‐based health insurance system, and a tool for
maintaining sufficient social consent for a system overall, while its egalitarian effect declined
for decades. Thus, triangular employment growth itself may be conceived as an instrument
that assisted U.S. policy makers somewhat in maintaining legitimacy of decades of regressive
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policy in both the retirement and healthcare regimes, and preserving the increasingly regressive
tax‐ subsidies embodied in both these regimes. The lack of significant policy response to the
expansion of triangular employment in the U.S., and the accommodation of certain policy
development to the privately generated concept of “co‐employment”, is consistent with these
views.

